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SECTION 4(0: ANALYZING DIFFERING
INTERPRETATIONS AND EXAMINING PROPOSALS

FOR REFORM
DavidEdwardKunz*
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E. TEA-21 Reauthorization Conference Committee Consideration
VI. ARRIVING WHERE WE STARTED-THE FUTURE OF § 4(f)
A. Possibilities for Change
B. Going Back to the Future
1. Restoring § 4(f)'s Legislative Roots
2. Mending the Judicial Split

We shall not ceasefrom our exploration, and at the end of all our exploring, we shall
arrive where we startedand know the placefor thefirst time.

-T.S. Eliot1

I. INTRODUCTION
Since its passage in 1966, § 4(f) of the Department of Transportation ("DOT") Act
of 19662 has been the subject of considerable debate within the transportation and
environmental communities. Section 4(0 was enacted during a time of growing
awareness and concern on the part of the public and its elected representatives for
preserving the environment and important historic sites from encroachment by and
possible destruction due to the growth of the transportation system. 3 It declared that
"[i]t is the policy of the United States Government that special effort should be made to
preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands,
wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites." 4 The section goes on to note that
transportation programs and projects requiring the use of protected lands shall not be
approved unless "(1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land; and
(2) the program or project includes all possible planning to minimize harm" to these
types of lands. 5 Although there is little continuing debate as to the virtues of the broad
policy set forth by § 4(f), there has been much disagreement and discussion within the
affected legal and policy communities as to the exact meaning, application, and reach of
6
this important provision of law.

I. Quotes of T.S. Eliot, The Quotations Page, available at http://www.quotationspage.com/search.
php3?Search=&startsearch=Search&Authorit.s.+eliott&C=coles&C=indsy&C=poorc&C-net&C=devis&C
=contrib (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
2. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2000)). The Act is termed "section
4(f)" in reference to its numbering in the Department of Transportation Act of 1966. See Pub. L. No. 89-670,
§ 4(f), 80 Stat. 934 (1966).
3. See, e.g., Richard Weingroff, Highway Existence:-]l00Years and Beyond: A Peaceful Campaign of
Progress and Reform: The Federal Highway Administration at 100, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/
infrastructure/rw93.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter FHWA History].
4. 49 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2000). For simplicity, this paper will generically refer to these types of lands as
"protected" lands.
5. 49 U.S.C. § 303(c)(1)-(2) (2000).
6. See, e.g., infra Part V.
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Section 4(f) has also produced a considerable body of case law as courts have
wrestled with many of the same issues debated within the environmental and
transportation policy communities, including the law's scope and application. 7 This
section also spawned the seminal administrative law case, Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 8 a case that is still viewed as a touchstone for the interpretation of federal
administrative law regarding environmental and transportation law and policy. 9 While
the interpretations rendered by the judicial system have not yet translated into changes
to the original statutory and regulatory scheme of § 4(f), several legislative proposals
are currently pending that would do precisely that--change the scope and application of
§ 4(f).' 0
The case law and policy debates on § 4(f) over the years have posed or raised a
number of questions and issues. For example: Why would such a seemingly beneficial
policy of preventing harm to some of the nation's most important lands, properties, and
resources be the subject of such intense debate? And, if changes were to be made to §
4(f), what impacts would result? What should the law be as to the protection of
environmental resources and historic properties when confronted with the challenges of
a growing population and an expanding highway and road network designed to help
accommodate this growing population? These are the questions that have been asked,
debated and discussed for nearly forty years. On the eve of the first substantial change
to § 4(f) via the transportation reauthorization bill that is currently winding its way
through Congress, 11 it is important to review these questions and seek answers that
might guide the transportation and environmental communities through the next forty
years of § 4(f)'s existence.
This discussion seeks to provide those answers to these questions. Part II begins
with a review of the history of § 4(f), examining the past in order to illuminate a future
path or paths. The discussion then turns to an analysis of the judicial, administrative
and legislative interpretations of § 4(f). Part III focuses on the differing interpretations
taken by the Supreme Court and certain federal courts of appeals. Part IV reviews
actions and interpretations taken by the DOT, as well as recent Bush administration
actions concerning § 4(f). Following this line of inquiry, the discussion proceeds in Part
V with an analysis of the two most recent Congresses' key legislative proposals that
have been offered in response to-or because of-the complex and occasionally
7. See, e.g., infra Part III.
8. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
9. See, e.g., JERRY MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM

CASES AND MATERIALS 708-18 (3d ed. 1992).
10. See infra Part V.
11. See Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2005, S. 732, 109th
Cong. (2005); Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, H.R. 3, 109th Cong. (2005). These bills are
essentially re-introductions of the 108th Congress bills and serve as the basis for continued debate during the
109th Congress. See also Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2004, S.
1072, 108th Cong. (2003); Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, H.R. 3550, 108th Cong. (2003).
These bills provided for the multi-year authorization of federal highway and transit programs and projects in
the 10 8 th Congress. Taken collectively, they are also the main legislative vehicles for the reauthorization of
the Transportation Equity Act for the 21s' Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998) [hereinafter
TEA-21], the programs of which expired on September 30, 2004. TEA-21 has been extended six times by
Congress, and the current extension expires on May 31, 2004. See Surface Transportation Extension Act of
2004, Part V, H.R. 5183, 108th Cong. (2004). This combined legislative process is commonly known as the
transportation bill reauthorization and/or TEA-21 reauthorization.
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controversial history that enshrouds this section of the law. The discussion concludes in
Part VI with an examination of the possibilities for the future of § 4(f).
I. FROM WHERE WE STARTED-THE HISTORY OF § 4(f)
What today is commonly known operationally and in practice as "§ 4(f)" 12 is the
result of several evolutionary legislative developments. Section 4(f) "represented the
first major legislative victory, apart from water resource development programs, in the
battle of conservationists for control of pubic works projects." 13 This victory, however,
was not absolute and not without its critics as the case law and subsequent legislative
developments discussed below will note.
A. Federal-AidHighway Act of 1966- "ConsiderationofAlternatives"
The opening move in the development of what has become known as § 4(f)
originated with an amendment to the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 196614 offered by
Senator Ralph Yarborough (D-TX). 15 This amendment was offered largely in response
to a proposal by the Texas Department of Highways to build a road through the
Brackenridge Park in San Antonio and was an effort to place limitations on state
departments of transportation when building highways that required the taking of
parklands. 16 The Senate ultimately approved this amendment and incorporated it with a
modification into the final conference report for the Federal-Aid Highways Act of
1966.17 The text of the provision as included in the conference report is the following:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that in carrying out the provisions of
this title, the Secretary shall use maximum effort to preserve Federal, State, and local
government parklands and historic sites and the beauty and historic value of such
lands and sites. The Secretary shall cooperate with the States in developing highway
plans and programs which carry out such policy. After July 1, 1968, the Secretary
shall not approve under § 105 of this title any program for a project which requires
the use for such project of any land from a Federal, State, or local government park or
historic site unless such program includes all possible planning, including

12. See, e.g., The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003, Sectionby-Section Analysis at Sec. 1604 available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reauthorization/ssatitlel.htm (last
visited Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter SAFETEA DOT Analysis] ("Former § 4(f) was originally enacted as part
of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 and is now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 303, but is still
commonly referred to as '§ 4(f)."').
13. Oscar S. Gray, Section 469 of the Department of TransportationAct, 32 MD. L. REv. 327,327 (1973).
14. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966, 23 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (2000). See also Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-574, 80 Stat. 766 (1966).
15. Gray, supra note 13, at 333-34. Senator Yarborough served on the Labor and Public Welfare
Committee. See Biography of Senator Ralph Webster Yarborough, available at http://bioguide.congress.gov/
scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=Y000006 (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
16. Gray, supra note 13, at 333-34 & n. 23.
17. Id. at 335. See also CONF. REP. ON FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY ACT OF 1966, H.R. REP. No. 89-1903
(1966).
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use of such land to minimize any harm to such
consideration of alternatives to the 18
use.
such
from
resulting
site
or
park
This final conference report language, now codified at 23 U.S.C. § 138,
incorporated one significant change from the original Yarborough amendment approved
by the Senate. Senator Yarborough's amendment originally included a requirement that
the Secretary of Transportation not approve any project using a protected land unless
there was no "feasible alternative to the use of such land." 19 As can be seen in the
above conference report language, this language was deleted, and language requiring a
"consideration of alternatives" was added instead. 20 Explanatory conference report
language specifically noted that "[t]he requirement that there be no feasible alternative
to the use of the land for highway purposes has been deleted and there has been added
include consideration of alternatives to the use
the requirement that the planning must
21
of this land for highway purposes."

B. Department of TransportationAct of 1966- "Feasibleand Prudent
Alternatives "

Concurrent with congressional consideration and passage of the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1966, Congress also considered legislation to create and establish the
DOT. 22 This legislation consolidated, for the first time, the major transportation modal
administrations and agencies responsible for aviation, highways, railroads, motor carrier
safety, the Coast Guard, and the Saint Lawrence Seaway. 23 In creating this new
cabinet-level department, Congress sought to not only establish the formal structures
that would govern the day-to-day operations of the department and its new constituent
administrations, but also to outline broad principles that would apply to the entire
DOT.

24

Among the general principles that Congress added to the DOT Act of 1966 were
two sections: §§ 2(a) and (b)(2) (Declaration of Purpose) and § 4(f). 25 These two
provisions, along with the Yarborough Amendment described above, were later to
become what is now commonly known within the transportation and environmental law
practice areas as "§ 4(f)." 26 Section 2(a) of the DOT Act of 1966 states the following:

18. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1903. This language was subsequently codified at 23 U.S.C. § 138 (2000).
19. See Gray, supra note 13, at 334 n. 24 (citing 112 CONG. REC. 14,074 (1966)).
20. Id. at 335. See also H.R. REP. No. 89-1903.
21. H.R. REP.NO. 89-1903at 11-12.
22. Gray, supra note 13, at 328. See also Department of Transportation Act of Oct. 25, 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (1966) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
23. Gray, supra note 13, at 328-29.
24. See id. The modal agencies created by the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 included the
following: the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, and the Federal
Highway Administration. "Other organizations transferred to DOT included the Coast Guard, from Treasury;
the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR), from Commerce to the new FHWA; and the Saint Lawrence Seaway
Development Corporation." Id. at 329.
25. See CONF. REP. OF THE DEP'T OF TRANSP. ACT OF 1966, H.R. REP. NO. 89-2236 (1966), reprinted in
1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3448-50.
26. See, e.g., SHERRY HUTT ET. AL., CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE
MANAGEMENT, PROTECTION, AND PRESERVATION OF HERITAGE RESOURCES 15-16 (2004).
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The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare, the economic growth and
stability of the Nation and its security require the development of national
transportation policies and programs conducive to the provision of fast, safe,
efficient, and convenient transportation at the lowest cost consistent therewith and
with other national objectives, including the efficient utilization and conservation of
27
the Nation'sresources.

§ 2(b)(2) notes "It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special efforts should
be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation
28
lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites."
The Senate Committee on Government Operations, one of the committees charged
with creating the DOT, also issued a committee report to accompany S. 3010, the
Senate's bill to establish the DOT. 29 In this report, the committee noted that § 4(f) and
the policy statements in § 2 "are designed to insure that in planning highways, railroad
rights-of-way, airports and other transportation facilities, care will be taken, to the
maximum extent possible, not to interfere with or disturb established recreational
facilities and refuges. ' 3° This statement by using the language "to the maximum extent
possible" implies that the Secretary, while being directed to apply a rigorous approach
when evaluating § 4(f) protected lands, is also allowed to temper that approach with
pragmatism; i.e., he or she must protect the lands but in doing so must only approve an
approach that is "possible" or workable.
1. Conference Report Language-§ 4(f)
The conference report for the DOT Act goes on to describe other broad guiding
principles for the DOT. In § 4, several general provisions are articulated that apply to
DOT and are not specific to any one modal administration. 3 1 Among these general
provisions is § 4(f) that, as enacted as part of the DOT Act of 1966, stated the
following:
The Secretary shall cooperate and consult with the Secretaries of the Interior,
Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture, and with the States in developing
transportation plans and programs that includes measures to maintain or enhance the
natural beauty of the lands traversed. After the effective date of this Act, the
Secretary shall not approve any program or project which requires the use of any land
from a public park, recreation area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site
unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2)
such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park,

27. H.R. REp. No. 89-2236 (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. See S. REp. No. 89-1659 (1966).

30. Id. at 6.
31. See H.R. REP. No. 89-2236.
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recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from such
use.

32

This conference report language was the result of the conferees adopting a
substitute amendment that made minor, but significant, changes to the original Senate
language of S. 3010 as amended.33 Most notable of these changes was the addition of
the words "and prudent" after "feasible." 34 The impact of these additions will be
explored in more detail below.
2. Conference Report Debate-§ 4(f)
During the House's floor consideration of the conference report, there was
discussion by some members of Congress who raised concerns about the scope and
reach of § 4(f). Congressman Kluczynski (D-IL) noted that while he generally
supported the bill, he "sound[ed] a word of caution in interpreting § 4(f)." 35 He argued
that the "protection of our parks, open spaces, historic sites, fish and game habitats, and
the other natural resources with which our Nation is so richly endowed is of the utmost
importance and urgency, but not to the total exclusion of other considerations. ' 36 In
fact, to provide disproportionate protections to these "protected" resources "would
result in as many inequities as justifying transportation plans merely on the basis of
economy or efficiency." 37 He continued his observations by identifying some of the
"other considerations" that should be taken into account when reviewing the efficacy of
a particular transportation project. 38 These other considerations "would include the
integrity of neighborhoods, the displacement of people and businesses, and the
protection of schools, and churches and the myriad of other social and human values we
find in our communities." 39 As will be noted in more detail below, these "other
considerations" have formed the basis of many present-day concerns regarding the
application of this section. Congressman Kluczynski, in fact, anticipated many of the
issues that have arisen in litigation and in policy debates since the passage of this
provision.
Also joining Congressman Kluczynski in his concerns about § 4(f) was his fellow
Illinois congressional delegation colleague, Congressman Rostenkowski, who would
later go on to lead the influential House Ways and Means Committee. Mr.
Rostenkowski, while supportive of the inclusion of § 4(f) in the bill, reiterated concerns

32. Id. This language has been subsequently codified at 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
33. See id. at 25. "The conference substitute amendment adopts the Senate amendment language except
for adding the words 'and prudent' after the word 'feasible."' Id.
34. See id.
35. 112 CONG. REc. H26,651 (1966) (statement of Rep. Kluczynski on the DOT Act Conference Report).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. Congressman Kluczynski ultimately did support the bill because he believed the planning
requirements and insertion of the word "prudent" as a modifier for the types of alternatives that must be
considered made § 4(f) "workable and effective." Nevertheless, the "word of caution" that he raised
regarding this section remains valid particularly as it relates to the "other considerations" he believed must be
accounted for when conducting an analysis under this section. See id.
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that were originally raised during debate on the Yarborough Amendment to the Federal
Highway Act.
"Fear was expressed," Congressman Rostenkowski noted, "that the
[Yarborough] amendment might be misinterpreted to mean the preservation of natural
and manmade resources would be the overriding consideration in highway
construction. '4 1 Rostenkowski made clear that his support for this provision was
contingent upon the inclusion of guidelines that required the Secretary of Transportation
to consider the feasibility and prudence of alternatives to use protected lands and also to
42
use "all possible planning to minimize harm" to the lands protected by the section.
These guidelines provide both protection to the lands identified in the section and also
give the Secretary a measure of discretion in his or her review process. This measure of
discretion was important to Congressman Rostenkowski, and he specifically noted that
he wanted "the Record to show . . . that it is not the intent of Congress to tie the
Secretary's hands." 43 Congressman Rostenkowski's statements, along with those of
Congressman Kluczynski, provide a key foundation for the interpretation of § 4(f).
In order to further illustrate his concerns, Congressman Rostenkowski offered
several examples of situations in which the application of § 4(f) to real-life situations
might prove problematic. 44 He envisioned situations where the Secretary might have to
"choose between preserving a wildlife refuge or saving human lives by a highway
improvement" or choose "between using public parkland or displacing hundreds of
families." 45 Therefore, to ensure that these types of Hobbesian choices could be
avoided to the maximum extent possible, Congressman Rostenkowksi argued that
"[Congress] should memorialize the Secretary to give full consideration to the
preservation of public lands, but not at the expense of human lives and human
welfare."' 46 With these concerns articulated, Congressman Rostenkowski offered his
support for the provision and the conference report, believing that the language would
47
adequately address his concerns.
C. Federal-AidHighway Act of 1968
After passage and enactment of both the Yarborough Amendment to the FederalAid Highway Act of 1966 and § 4(f) of the DOT Act of 1966, it quickly became
apparent that the slight variation between the two provisions-one applying only to the
Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA") (the Yarborough Amendment) and the
other applying to the entire DOT, including the FHWA as well as other modal agencies
(§ 4(f))--created confusion with state and local governments and in the transportation
community. 48 The language of the Yarborough Amendment as codified did not include
40. See 112 CONG. REC. H26,651 (1966) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski on the DOT Act Conference
Report).
41. Id.

42. Id.
43. Id.

44. Id.
45. See 112 CONG. REc. H26,651-52 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1966) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski on the
DOT Act Conference Report).
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. See generally § 4(f) Policy Paper, Fed. Highway Admin. (Sept. 24, 1987, rev. June 7, 1989) (on file
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the "feasible and prudent alternatives" analysis required under § 4(f).4 9 As a result of
this discrepancy and the cloud it cast over transportation projects, Congress revisited
this issue in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968.50
Initially, the House and Senate Public Works Committees 51 proposed to correct this
discrepancy by "chang[ing] § 4(f) to read more like § 138. " 52 This proposal was met
with opposition by the environmental and preservationist communities 53 and
necessitated a different approach by the conference committee in order to find an
acceptable solution. The result was that "both § 4(f) of the DOT Act and section 138
were amended so as to be identical to each other." 54 The resulting conference language
as codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970) is the following:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be made to
preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands,
wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites. The Secretary of Transportation
shall cooperate and consult with the Secretaries of the Interior, Housing and Urban
Development, and Agriculture, and with the States in developing transportation plans
and programs that include measures to maintain or enhance the natural beauty of the
lands traversed. After the effective date of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, the
Secretary shall not approve any program or project which requires the use of any
publicly owned land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl
refuge of national, State or local significance as determined by the Federal, State or
local officials having jurisdiction thereof, or any land from an historic site of national,
State, or local significance as so determined by such officials unless (1) there is no
feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program
area,
includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park, recreational
55
use.
such
from
resulting
site
historic
or
refuge,
wildlife and waterfowl

Essentially, the new language used § 4(f) as the base text and added a few new
provisions. 56 First, § 2(b) of the DOT Act of 1966 was incorporated into the beginning
as a statement of national policy. 57 Second, the words "publicly owned" were inserted
as a modifier for "land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl
refuge." 58 Finally, the lands protected by the section were to be of "national, State or

with author) [hereinafter 4(f) Policy Paper 1989]. See also Gray, supra note 13, at 338.
49. Gray, supra note 13, at 338.
50. Id.
51. At the time, these two committees were the committees of authorizing jurisdiction. Today, the
committees with primary jurisdiction over the FHWA and the DOT are the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee; the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee; and the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.
52. Gray, supra note 13, at 339.
53. Id. The environmental community was concerned that eliminating the "feasible and prudent
alternatives" requirement in favor of a mere "consideration of alternatives" would water down the overall
provision and result in more loss of protected lands. Id. at n.3.
54. Id. at 339-40.
55. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2000)).
56. See Gray, supranote 13, at 340.
57. See id.
58. Note that the modifier "publicly owned" does not apply to historic sites. See Gray, supra note 13, at
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local significance as determined by the Federal, State or local officials." 59 These
changes ensured that the "feasible and prudent alternatives" language remained in
effect-an issue of importance to the environmental community.
A review of the committee reports accompanying this legislation also reveals
Congressional concern over the scope and application of § 4(f). House Report 1799
noted the following:
This amendment of both relevant sections of law is intended to make it unmistakably
clear that neither section constitutes a mandatory prohibition against the use of
enumerated lands; but rather, is a discretionary authority which must be used with
both wisdom and reason. The Congress does not believe, for example, that
substantial numbers of people should be required to move in order to preserve these
lands, or that clearly
enunciated a local preference should be overturned on the basis
60
of this authority.
This clearly indicates that Congress did not necessarily intend that § 4(f) be strictly and
stringently interpreted. In fact, the legislative history indicates a strong inclination for
local decision-making. The legislative history also notes that § 4(f) should be applied
with "wisdom and reason." 61 As will be seen in the discussion below, this issue has
been a source of contention and disagreement among some of the circuit courts of
appeal.
D. Recodification ofthe DOT Act of 1983 and Amendment of 1987
Section 4(f) remained unchanged until, as part of an "overall recodification of the
DOT Act, § 4(f) was amended and codified in 49 U.S.C. § 303. " 62 This version of 4(f)
remains in effect today with only one minor change occurring since this
recodification. 63 The language of § 4(f) currently in effect is codified at 49 U.S.C. §
303:
It is the policy of the United States Government that special effort be made to
preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands,
wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites.

(b) The Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate and consult with the Secretaries
of the Interior, Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture, and with the
States, in developing transportation plans and programs that include measures to
340.
59. See id.
60. H.R. REP. No. 90-1799 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3531, 3538 (emphasis in original).
61. Id.
62. 4(f) Policy Paper 1989, supra note 48.
63. The only additional change made to § 4(f) since the 1983 recodification was a 1987 amendment.
This amendment inserted in subsection (c) after "requiring the use" the following language: "(other than any
project for a road or parkway under § 204 of Title 23)." See 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2000). See also Pub. L. No.
100-17, Title 1, § 133(d), 101 Stat. 173 (1987).
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maintain or enhance the natural beauty of lands crossed by transportation activities or
facilities.

(c) The Secretary may approve a transportation program or project requiring the use
of publicly owned land of a public park, recreation areas or wildlife and waterfowl
refuge, or land of an historic site of national, State, or local significance (as
determined by the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction over the park,
recreation areas refuge, or site) only if,
(1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land; and
(2) the program or project includes all possible planning to minimize harm to
area, wildlife and waterfowl refuges or historic site
the park, recreation 64
resulting from the use.
As can be seen upon comparison of the above language with the earlier versions, no
substantial changes were made to § 4(f). In addition, as the FHWA noted, "[t]he
legislative history of the 1983 recodification indicates that no substantive change was
intended" to § 4(f).65 Moreover, "because of familiarity with § 4(f) by thousands of
Federal and state personnel, the Federal Highway Administration continues to refer to
the requirements as § 4(f)." 66 Unfortunately, "§ 138 was not amended, so the wording
in the two sections is once again different." 6 7 Nevertheless, 49 U.S.C. § 303, as
recodified in 1983 and slightly modified in 1987, represents the current statutory
treatment of § 4(f), and it is this current form that has been the subject of ongoing
debate within the transportation and environmental communities.
III. EXPLORING THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS-A SPLIT AMONG THE
CIRCUITS
Since its inception, § 4(f) has been the subject of debate and differing opinions as
to its meaning and scope. 68 In fact, "[n]ext to the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"), Section 4(f) has been the most frequently litigated environmental statute in
the Federal Highway Program. ' 69 It has also been "the most frequent cause of court
injunctions halting highway programs." 70 These many cases have helped define the
landscape of § 4(f), and as will be seen in the discussion below, some facets of the
section have been interpreted differently in certain circuits. The discussion below
focuses, first, on the seminal § 4(f) Supreme Court case-Citizens to Preserve Overton

64. 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
65. 4(f) Policy Paper 1989, supra note 48.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See e.g., 4(f) Policy Paper 1989, supra note 48.
69. § 4(F)-INTRODUCTION: LEGAL OVERVIEW (2004), available at http://www.section4f.com/case_
studies.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2005) (overview of § 4(f) legal issues).
70. Id.
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Park v. Volpe 71-and then turns to key, representative cases from several different
United States Courts of Appeal that highlight the competing views on the scope and
application of § 4(f) taken by some circuits. As will be seen, these differing viewpoints
tend to fall primarily into one of two camps: (1) a more flexible, balanced approach;
and (2) a more stringent and strict approach.
A. United States Supreme Court-Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe
Interestingly enough--despite the large volume of litigation involving § 4(f)-only
one case concerning § 4(f) has been litigated before the Supreme Court: Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe. 72 Overton Park involved the review of a proposed
73
highway project in Memphis, Tennessee.
The plaintiffs/petitioners-a group of private citizens allied to stop the use of
Overton Park for a highway-challenged the Secretary of Transportation's approval of
a planned highway project that was to be routed through the park. 74 The citizens' group
argued that the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) did not properly meet his
obligations under § 4(f). First, they alleged that the Secretary did not produce a formal
finding documenting his decision, thus making it difficult for the court to analyze and
review the Secretary's decision. 75 Second, alternative routes that would not impact the
park existed and these alternatives were both "feasible and prudent." 76 Third, and
finally, the citizens argued that even if those alternatives were deemed not "feasible and
prudent," "all possible" methods were not taken to minimize the highway's harm to the
park. 77 The Secretary argued that his approval of the project was based upon the fact
that the route through the park was authorized by the Bureau of Public Roads in 1956
and also approved by local officials. 78 Affidavits attesting to the rationale of the
Secretary in making his decision, as well as indicating the independence with which he
79
exercised his project approval discretion, were introduced at the district court.
Both the district court and the court of appeals ruled in favor of the Secretary and
noted in their decisions that the Secretary did not need to make formal findings when
approving the project and that his authority and discretion was broad. 80 The Supreme
81
Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Marshall and joined by five of his brethren,
reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings. 82 The Court noted
that while formal findings on the part of the Secretary were not required, additional
evidence beyond that provided for in the affidavits was needed to support the

71. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 406.
74. Id.
75. 401 U.S at 408.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 407.
79. Id. at 409. Opposing and contradicting affidavits were also filed by the citizens group. Id.
80. 401 U.S. at 409.
81. Id. at 403. Justice Marshall was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan,
Stewart, White, and Blackmun.
82. 401 U.S. at 406.
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Secretary's decision. 83 Therefore, the case was remanded to the district court for
the Secretary's rationale in approving the project and his
further investigation as to
84
decision-making process.
Overton Park, however, is notable in § 4(f) practice and lore for the statements
made in the opinion's dicta. 85 It is these statements that have attributed much to the
interpretation of § 4(f) and have also been the subject of discussion in some of the more
recent federal decisions concerning § 4(f). Chief among the issues raised in Overton
Park's dicta is the Court's statement that the Secretary may not approve a project that
unless the alternative to using the parkland
would result in "destruction of parkland"
86
problems."
"unique
would itself pose
The Court elaborates on what constitutes a "unique" problem. Factors regarding
the alternatives to using parkland or other protected lands such as "cost, directness of
route, and community disruption" are not unique, according to the Court. 87 These types
of factors were already taken into account when § 4(f) was enacted because "if
Congress [had] intended these factors to be on an equal footing with the preservation of
parkland there would have been no need for [§ 4(f)]." 88 In taking this position, the
Court rejected the Secretary's contention that he should be able to "engage in a wideranging balancing of competing interests." 89 And, as will be seen below, some circuits
have backed away from this outright rejection of a balancing test as it applies to
determining whether no "feasible and prudent" alternative exists to the use of protected
lands. 90 Others circuits, however, have followed closely the dicta in Overton Park and
with an alternative route justifies
required a clear showing that a "unique problem"
91
encroachment on a park or other protected land.
B. Flexibility and Balance-7th, 4th, and D.C. Circuits
The late 1960's and the 1970's represented a time of peak expansion of the
interstate highway system. 92 It was a time when new roads and highways were being
built in large numbers and when many citizens were concerned that parks and historic
areas would be lost or destroyed due to the advance of the bulldozer and road
builders. 93 It was precisely for these reasons and to address these concerns that § 4(f)
was enacted. 94 However, as "[t]oday's highway program is oriented much more toward
system preservation and modernization" rather than to system expansion, the "rigid
83. Id. at 409.
84. Id. at 420.
85. In addition, the case is noteworthy in the administrative law field. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 9, at
708-18.
86. Overton Park,401 U.S. at 413.
87. Id. at411.
88. Id. at 412.
89. Id. at 411.
90. See, e.g., Eagle Found. v. Dole, 813 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1987); Hickory Neighborhood Defense
League v. Skinner, 910 F.2d 159 (4th Cit. 1990).
91. See, e.g., La. Envtl. Soc'y v. Coleman, 537 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1976); Druid Hills Civic Ass'n. v.
FHWA, 772 F.2d 700 (11 th Cir. 1985); Stop H-3 Ass'n. v. Brinegar, 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984).
92. See, e.g., FHWA History, supra note 3.
93. See, e.g., SAFETEA DOT Analysis, supra note 12, at Sec. 1604.
94. Id.
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rules for applying § 4(f)" are often out of step with real world practices. 95 Several
circuit courts have reflected this notion in their decisions and have moved the § 4(f)
jurisprudence away from the strict constructionist view espoused by Overton Park. The
following discussion analyzes several key and representative cases that have favored a
more flexible and balanced interpretation and application of § 4(0.
1. Eagle Foundationv. Dole-7th Circuit
One of the seminal cases that helped define a newer approach to interpreting § 4(f)
is Eagle Foundation v. Dole.96 This case involved a challenge to a planned four-lane
highway to connect Decatur, Springfield, and Jacksonville, Illinois with Hannibal,
Missouri. 97 This connection necessitated constructing a bridge to cross the Illinois
River. 98 The plans for the bridge were controversial because its construction impacted
both the Pike County Conservation Area, 99 parts of which serve as winter roosting spots
for the bald eagle, as well as the Wade Farm, an historic farm dating to the
1840's that
100
was also eligible for inclusion in the National Register for Historic Places.
Due to the potential impacts that this transportation project posed to both a wildlife
refuge and a historic place, § 4(f) was necessarily implicated. The plaintiff/appellant,
Eagle Foundation, Inc.,l 0 1 "[sought] to block construction of the highway on the ground
that ...§ 4(f) prohibited the construction as a substantive matter." 10 2 The trial court
held that the "Secretary [of Transportation] did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in
concluding that ...no other placement of the bridge across the Illinois River is 'feasible
and prudent." ' 10 3 In addition, the trial court also held that the plans for the highway
"minimize[d] the harm" to the protected property. 10 4 Thus, the Secretary was found to
be in compliance with both prongs of § 4(f), and the court allowed the project to
proceed even though it impacted § 4(f)-protected property because no other "feasible
and prudent" altemative existed and any harms to the protected lands were
minimized. 10 5 Eagle Foundation subsequently appealed this decision to the Seventh
06
Circuit Court of Appeals.1
Writing the opinion for the three judge panel, Judge Easterbrook upheld the district
court's decision and provided a new interpretation of the views espoused in Overton
Park.10 7 Easterbrook argued that the Secretary of Transportation should be given a fair
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
Hallow,

1d.
813 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 800.
Id.
See id. at 800 ("[T]he 862-acre Pike County Conservation Area ("PCCA"), which includes Napolean
was established to preserve wildlife, some to be watched and some to be hunted.").

100. Id.

101. Eagle Foundation, in addition to having an interest in any development in the PCCA that might
disrupt the habitat of the bald eagles known to inhabit the area, also had a leasehold interest in the Wade
Farm. 813 F.2d at 801.
102. Id.
103. Id.

104. Id.
105. See id.

106. Id. at 798.
107. See 813 F.2d at 804-05.
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amount of latitude in applying and interpreting the § 4(f) requirements. 10 8 More
significantly, the decision in Eagle Foundation established the notion that the Secretary,
in carrying out his or her responsibilities pursuant to § 4(f), should balance competing
'1 9
0
This is a clear departure
interests in determining what is "feasible and prudent."
110
Park.
Overton
in
voiced
from the rigid interpretations
However, Eagle Foundation did not stop with the statement that the Secretary be
allowed to engage in a balancing test to determine whether a project should be advanced
given the § 4(f) requirements. In fact, it went further by directly taking issue with the
Supreme Court's use of the word "unique" to describe those types of problems that are
I
required to be proven in order to warrant using protected land for a highway project." '
Essentially, the Eagle Foundation court argued that if the Supreme Court really
required a showing of "unique" problems to justify taking protected land for a highway
project, then no taking would ever be justified because these type of problems and
situations are almost "one of a kind." 112 A review, according to the court, of the
legislative intent of § 4(f), argues against "such an extreme position." 113
The court goes on to state that "we cannot believe ... the Supreme Court meant
that if a risk or cost has been accepted, or an obstacle overcome, for any highway in the
United States, then it always must be accepted or overcome in preference to the use of
any § 4(f) lands ... "114 Indeed, all that is necessary for the Secretary to overcome the
reason. 115 Once "the
presumption against using § 4(f) lands is a "good," and prudent
116
Secretary makes that hard decision, it must be respected."'
While this interpretation of the requirements of § 4(f) clearly redefines and
reframes the scope and depth of § 4(f) review by both the Secretary and the courts,
Eagle Foundationprovides yet a further redefinition. In conducting a § 4(f) review and
117
inquiry, the Secretary may take into account "everything important that matters."
of
Thus, a Secretary may approve a project even though it requires the taking and/or use 118
§ 4(f) protected lands if "[a] cumulation of small problems" warrants such action.
This reasoning would likely not withstand the rigid construction articulated by the
Overton Park Court. However, "aggregate injuries," if sufficient, may even meet the

108. See id. at 804. ("The statutory standard makes deferential review inevitable.").
109. Id.
110. Compare Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411. ("[N]o such wide-ranging endeavor [referencing the
Secretary's assertion that he be allowed to 'engage in a wide-ranging balancing of competing interests'] was
intended [by Congress].") with Eagle Found., 813 F.2d at 804 ("Yet we cannot believe that the Supreme
Court meant that if a risk or cost has been accepted, or an obstacle overcome, for any highway in the United
States, then it always must be accepted or overcome in preference to the use of any § 4(f) lands, however
trifling the effects of using the § 4(f) lands.").
11l. See Eagle Found., 813 F.2d at 804.
112. Id. In discussing the Supreme Court's requirement that a problem be "unique" in order to allow a
highway project to take protected land, the court observed that ' [u]nique' is a word without degree; a
situation is unique (nonpareil, one of a kind) or it is not." Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 805.
116. 813 F.2d at 805.
117. Id.
118. Id. The court also cited Town of Fenton v. Dole, 636 F. Supp. 557, 567 (N.D.N.Y.), affd, 792 F.2d
44 (2d Cir. 1986), to support this "cumulation" argument. Id.
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threshold test of uniqueness as espoused by Overton Park.119 In Eagle Foundation,the
court cited a "two-volume study" as evidence of an accumulation of problems that
justified routing the highway through otherwise protected lands. 12 This new gloss on
Overton Parksubstantially enlarged the discretion of the Secretary when conducting a §
4(f) review. No longer would the Secretary be confined to a consideration of only
large, "unique" problems when reviewing the efficacy of a highway project; now,
12 1
"[e]ven a featherweight drawback may play some role."
Related to the issue of considering aggregate problems and injuries is the issue of
how searching a § 4(f) review and inquiry should be in terms of looking at these
alternatives and potential problems. 122 This is an issue that continues to vex highway
and transportation planners and can often drive project costs up as reviews try to be all
encompassing. 123 Rather than have the highway planners continue to "look at a few
more" options, the court argued that the proper inquiry is "whether enough have been
examined to permit a sound judgment that the study of additional variations is not
worthwhile." 124 In the instant case, the court found that DOT "examined more than ten
' 126
routes"' 125 within a "ten by six mile area."
The court deemed this level of review and
127
sufficient.
as
Secretary
analysis by the
Finally, the court considered the issue of whether or not the Secretary approved a
plan that minimized the harms to the § 4(f) protected lands. 128 As with its finding
regarding the scope of review for alternatives, the court also found the Secretary took
sufficient steps in approving a plan that would "minimize the harm[s]" to the protected
lands. 129 The court also noted that the requirement to "minimize the harm[s]" should be
viewed in the context of a broader "national interest" in protecting § 4(f) protected
lands. 130 Therefore, taking and using a small amount of protected lands may be
13
justified if the alternative might mean "more total damage" to other protected lands. 1
Eagle Foundationrepresented another piece in the increasingly fractured picture of
what § 4(f) means in both the legal and the practical settings. The case, a victory for
highway and transportation advocates, further widened the gap between the circuits
over how to interpret § 4(f), as well as how to apply the principles of Overton Park.
Indeed, for the first time since Overton Park,a United States Court of Appeals set forth
a significant, new interpretation of Overton Park. Now, for projects in the Midwestern
states of the Seventh Circuit (Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin), the Secretary of
Transportation was provided with broader discretion when exercising his or her
judgment on transportation projects. The Secretary could now balance competing
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
813 F.2d at 805.
See id. at 807.
See infra Part V.A. 1.
Eagle Found., 813 F.2dat 807.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 808.
Id. at 809-810.
Id. at 810.
813 F.2d at 810.

131. Id.
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interests when determining whether or not an alternative might be "feasible and
prudent"; consider an accumulation of problems in making the same determination; and
take into account a broader national interest when signing off on steps to minimize
harms to protected lands, the use or taking of which may be required to advance a
transportation project. This interpretation altered the landscape surrounding § 4(f).
Other circuit courts followed its lead.
2. Hickory Neighborhood Defense League v. Skinner--4th Circuit
Three years after Eagle Foundation, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals joined
with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of § 4(f). In Hickory NeighborhoodDefense
League v. Skinner,132 the court considered a challenge to the Secretary of
Transportation's approval of a highway widening project that required using property in
an historic district. 133 The plaintiff/appellant, the Hickory Neighborhood Defense
League, sought to enjoin this project on the grounds that the Secretary did not adhere to
his responsibilities under § 4(f). 13 4 The district court rejected the challenge and found
that the Secretary had complied with § 4(f). 135 This decision had been appealed and
then remanded by the Fourth Circuit in Hickory Neighborhood i136 for additional
review on the question of whether "the Secretary determined that the alternatives to the
widening of N.C. Highway 127 were not prudent in light of Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe."' 13 7 Upon remand, the district court again found that the
Secretary acted appropriately under § 4(f), and this decision was again appealed in
Hickory Neighborhood11.138
In considering this second appeal, the Fourth Circuit followed the views espoused
in Eagle Foundation and found that the Secretary had properly exercised his discretion
under § 4(f). 139 In reaching this decision, the court noted that the touchstone words
used by the Supreme Court in Overton Park--"unique" and "extraordinary"-described
those problems that justified approval of a project requiring the use of § 4(f) protected
lands and were not to be substituted for the statutory term "prudent. ' 14° Thus, the
Secretary need not "expressly indicate a finding of unique problems" as long as the
"record amply supports [his or her] conclusion that ...

there were compelling reasons

14 1

for rejecting the proposed alternatives as not prudent."'
The Hickory Neighborhood II court also affirmed the "cumulation of problems"
rationale as an independent or additional basis that a Secretary may cite in approving a
project under § 4(f). 142 Again, this holding both affirms the reasoning articulated in
132. Hickory Neighborhood Def. League v. Skinner II, 910 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Hickory
NeighborhoodII].
133. Id. at 161.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 162.
136. Hickory Neighborhood Defense League v. Skinner 1,893 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1990).
137. Hickory Neighborhood 11, 910 F.2d at 162.
138. Id.
139. Id.
at 163.
140. See id. at 162-63 (citing EagleFound. 813 F.2d at 804-05).
141. Hickory Neighborhood 11,910 F.2d at 163 (4th Cir. 1990).
142. Id. See also discussion, supra at Part 1I1.B.2.
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Eagle Foundation and represents a further distancing from the standards set forth in
Overton Park. Further, it highlighted a growing split among the circuits as to how
strictly to interpret and apply § 4(f). By the time of Hickory Neighborhood II, nearly 20
years had passed since Overton Park. In that time, numerous § 4(f) cases had been
litigated, with some courts such as those in Eagle Foundation and Hickory
NeighborhoodII taking a more balanced, more pro-transportation view of § 4(f). Other
courts adopted a stricter, pro-environment and historical preservation viewpoint
regarding § 4(f). The debate and the split continue.
3. Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey-D.C. Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has addressed numerous
§ 4(f) issues over the years. In Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 143 the court
reviewed a § 4(f) challenge to an airport expansion project in Toledo, Ohio alleging that
noise impacts to the Oak Openings Preserve Metropark would be caused by the airport
expansion. 144 The plaintiff/appellant, a citizens' group formed in opposition to the
project at issue, argued the expansion would "constructively 'use' a campground in the
145
Metropark by "subject[ing] the camp to nighttime noise of up to Ldn 75 decibels."
The Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA")146rejected the argument, and Citizens
Against Burlington appealed to the D.C. Circuit.
In considering this constructive use argument, the court turned to Overton Park for
guidance. 147 Making a point to highlight the deferential standard of review that must be
accorded to agency decision-makers under Overton Park, the court noted that if an
agency's "decision was reasonable [then] ... we are not entitled to displace its decision
with our own or with anyone else's." 148 The key word, here, is "reasonable." The D.C.
Circuit cited the Federal Aviation Administration's ("FAA") findings and upheld the
agency findings as appropriate and not in violation of § 4(f).149 Thus, the court
implicitly stated that it is "reasonable" for the FAA to conclude that the only alternative
presented to the airport expansion was to expand an airport in Fort Wayne, Indiana and
that alternative would be contrary to the goals of this transportation
project:
' 150
"[piroviding the Toledo area with a modem, effective cargo hub."
The significance of this case with respect to § 4(f) jurisprudence is the court's
restatement of the Overton Park deferential standard of review for agency decisions.
This standard can, at times, be lost as courts wade into the intricacies of § 4(f) and fail
to see the forest for the trees. Courts in § 4(f) cases are often called upon to interject
their opinion or their own analysis as to which alignment or which alternative should be
approved. Citizens Against Burlington stands as a reminder that "federal courts are
neither empowered nor competent to micromanage strategies for saving the nation's

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

938 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Id. at 191.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 203.
148. Id.
149. 938 F.2d at 203-04.
150. Id. at 204.
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parklands." 15 1 Rather, the federal agencies should be given deference by courts in
reviewing their actions as the agencies are better equipped to apply laws such as § 4(f).
4. Sierra Club v. Dole-D.C. Circuit
In the case of Sierra Club v. Dole,152 the D.C. Circuit evaluated a challenge to a
plan to allow Boeing 737 jet airplanes to operate out of Jackson Hole Airport in
Wyoming. 153 One question this case examines is when § 4(f) prohibits a use of
protected lands. 154 How significant must the use of protected lands be to trigger the
requirements of § 4(f)? Since propeller planes were already operating out of the
airport-and had been for over forty-five years-the case turned on whether or not the
additional noise from the jet55airplanes amounted to a "constructive use" of the nearby
Grand Teton National Park.1
156
The court held that the additional noise did not constitute "use" under § 4(f).
Citing legislative history, the court noted that "Congress gave no indication that [§ 4(f)]
was intended to create ongoing review of relatively minor changes in the operational
characteristics of an established transportation facility."' 157 In effect, the court
recognized that certain exceptions might apply to § 4(f) and allowed for a degree of
flexibility in how § 4(f) is administered. As the court noted, "[i]t can hardly be
expected, once an airport has been in operation, that every change in flight scheduling
or operations must be accompanied" by a § 4(f) evaluation. This approach makes
sense; any "contrary view of the statute would produce a blizzard of useless [§ 4(f)]
statements." 158 If Sierra Club v. Dole represents one end of the § 4(f) spectrum, there is
an equal and opposite end as the following discussion will explore.
C. Strict Interpretation-Sth,9th and 1 1 th Circuits
While some circuits were busy putting their own interpretations on Overton Park,
other circuits were content not to stray from the Overton Park line of reasoning. These
latter circuits chose a path supported by many in the environmental and historic
preservation communities that seek to have a high bar established for any transportation
project requiring the use of § 4(f) protected lands. The following discussion examines
this path and the key cases from those circuits that have pursued such a course.

15 1. Id. at 204. This statement was made specifically in response to a request by the Citizens Against

Burlington for "[the court] to force the FAA to pinpoint the new campground's geographic coordinates." Id.
However, the statement was part of a more general discussion by the court on the importance of being
deferential to the decisions of the agencies. The court argued strongly that "Congress wanted the agencies,
not the courts, to evaluate plans to reduce environmental damage." Id.
152. 753 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
153. Id. at 122.
154. See id. at 130.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 753 F.2d at 130.
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1. Louisiana EnvironmentalSociety v. Coleman-5th Circuit
In one of the earlier cases litigated after Overton Park,the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Louisiana Environmental Society v. Coleman159 considered a case involving
the construction of a highway project in Louisiana through a recreational area known as
Cross Lake. 16 In Louisiana Environmental Society, the plaintiff/appellant, Louisiana
Environmental Society ("LES"), challenged the approval of a project by the Secretary
as not being consistent with the criteria of § 4(f) and that the Secretary's findings were
not supported by fact. 161 The district court denied the challenge and refused to issue a
setting up an appeal by LES and the
permanent injunction against the project
162
Circuit.
Fifth
the
by
subsequent decision
Using the guideposts provided by Overton Park, the court considered three main
questions that must be answered when reviewing a case under § 4(). 16 3 First, "[c]ould
[the Secretary] have reasonably believed that there was no substantial taking [of a
recreational area]?" 164 Second, "[c]ould the Secretary have reasonably believed ...that
there were truly unusual factors?"'165 And, third, "[c]ould [the Secretary] have
reasonably believed that the alternate routes presented unique problems?" 166 As the
would require
court indicated, "an affirmative answer to any [of these questions] 167
dismissing the plaintiffs' attack on the Secretary's § 4(f) determination."
These questions track closely to the analysis of Overton Park, but they contrast
with the decisions issued ten years later in Eagle Foundation and Hickory
Neighborhood. 68 The Fifth Circuit in this case was not yet ready to move away from
the strict § 4(f) interpretation established by Overton Park. In fact, the court even
added some additional gloss of its own, noting that "the spirit of Overton Park is clearly
to the effect that the statute is to be read broadly to protect greenlands." 169 Therefore,
the court argued that even a minimal taking of protected lands for the purposes 1of
70
advancing a transportation project is sufficient to trigger the requirements of § 4(f).
Any other interpretation of the requirements of § 4(f) would "permit an initial appraisal
of whether the use was substantial, [and] . . . would infuse consideration of elements

(such as the degree of harm to the park, animal life, environment, etc.) which Congress
did not want considered when it said, if there is another way, take it."17 1 This
interpretation, again, contrasts sharply with the balancing approach offered by Eagle
Foundation and its progeny.

159. 537 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1976).
160. See id. at 81.
161. Id. at 81-82.
162. Id. at81.
163. Id. at 84.
164. Id.
165. 537 F.2d at84.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See discussion supra Part III.B.
169. 537 F.2d at 84.
170. Id. The court noted that "Overton Park [did not] enunciate any sort of substantial taking threshold
Id.
forthe applicability of § 4(f)."
171. Id.
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In examining if "unusual factors" might warrant the use of § 4(f) protected lands,
the court delineated several points of analysis to guide DOT's § 4(f) review process.
Most notably, the court stated that "Section 4(f)(1) requires that each 'alternative to the
use' of the parkland must be found to be either infeasible or imprudent before the
Secretary can approve the use of parkland."' 172 In addition, "[a]n alternate route which
uses any part of a park is not an alternative to use of the park."' 17 3 Thus, in this case, the
court held that the Secretary's review of the alternatives was incomplete and "did not
make the requisite testing of the various routes to determine how to keep harm to the
lake to a minimum." 174 These additional analytical requirements expanded the
alternative review process that the Secretary must undertake pursuant to § 4(f) and
again raised the bar to project development and construction requiring the use of
parkland.
On the issue of what constitutes a "unique" problem that would justify the taking or
use of a § 4(f) protected land, the Fifth Circuit added to the Overton Park definition by
noting that a long time delay is not a "unique" problem. 175 This is a substantial
enlargement of the Overton Park definition because in Louisiana Environmental
Society, the lower court had found that proceeding with an alternative route that did not
use a protected land would add ten additional years to the project. 176 Even a delay as
substantial as a decade was insufficient to rise to the status of "unique."' 177 The court
observed that "[i]f time 1is78 the penalty, it cannot be turned into an exception which
justifies noncompliance."'
Overall, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Louisiana Environmental Society both
affirms and expands Overton Park. It rejects the notion that a protected property taking
must be "substantial" in order to activate § 4(f) requirements. The decision denies the
use of a balancing test that may justify building a project even though it uses or takes a
§ 4(f) protected land. It also simultaneously expands the alternatives analysis review to
ensure that no alternatives are considered that even minimally require the use of a
protected land. Finally, the court's opinion dismisses the argument that a lengthy
delay-even one as long as a decade--constitutes a "unique" problem, the presence of
which would allow the project to go forward even if it used protected property.
2. Stop H-3 Association v. Dole-9th Circuit
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Stop H-3 Association v. Dole179 took its
turn at tackling § 4(f) issues, and like the court in Louisiana Environmental Society, it
affirmed Overton Park and also offered its own additional views on the scope of §

172. Id. at 85.
173. Id. (citing Finish Allatoona's Interstate Right, Inc. v. Brinegar, 484 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1973); Citizens
to Preserve Foster Park v. Volpe, 466 F. 2d 991 (7th Cir. 1972)).
174. La. Envtl. Soc 'y, 537 F.2d at 86. In the case of the Cross Lake project, eight different alternatives
were reviewed, some of which involved only minimal use of the parkland. Id. at 82-84.
175. See id. at 85.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. Id.

179. 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984).
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4(f).180 Stop H-3 involved a § 4(f) challenge by three environmental and community
groups 18 1 to a planned Interstate highway project that required the taking and using of
land from "two public parklands: (1) Ho'omaluhia Park, a major regional park; and (2)
Pali Golf Course Park, one of Oahu's most challenging and heavily used public golf
courses."' 182 After the district court rejected their challenges, the groups appealed to the
183
Ninth Circuit.

Following Overton Park, the court ultimately reversed the district court's
affirmation of the Secretary's decision to approve the H-3 highway project and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 184 The court noted that "the requirements of
section 4(f) are stringent."' 185 It also reaffirmed the views of Overton Park regarding
"unique problems." ' 186 Specifically, the court noted that the dislocation of a church,
four businesses, thirty-one residences, increased noise, air and visual pollution, and
higher costs were all insufficient to rise to the standard of "unique" problems requiring
the approval of an alignment that would prevent such problems as an alignment using
parklands. 187 In addition, the court declined to rule on a "totality of circumstances"
theory that was argued at the trial court as justification for approving the alignment
requiring the use of parklands, because "even when amalgamated [the reasons] do not
188
satisfy the Overton Park standards."
While Stop H-3 is important for its affirmation of Overton Park,it is also important
for its commentary on two additional issues that often arise in § 4(f) litigation: (1) how
to weigh safety issues in the context of "unique" problems 189 and (2) how to review "no
build" alternatives. 190 The court's observations on these issues, again, raised the
"stringent" Overton Park standards. And, according to some, they have substantially
interfered with the "cooperative federalism" model that governs modem transportation
191
project construction.
On the issue of safety considerations, the court stated that "since they so directly
involve human life, [they] warrant extremely close scrutiny when determining whether
such considerations satisfy the Overton Park standards." 19 2 While "[n]either a court
nor an agency should weigh lightly the potential risk to human life an alternative might
pose," the court was also concerned that "undue deference" to such considerations
might turn such inquiry into a "talisman" that might be cited in every § 4(f) case to
ensure approval or non-approval of a project or alternative depending on the desired

180. See generally id.
181. Stop H-3 Association and Life of the Land-two non-profit organizations "chartered for the purpose
of opposing the construction of H-3, and Hui Malama Aina 0 Ko'olau, an unincorporated association formed
'to protect the Hawaiian people, the Hawaiian lifestyle, and the land from destruction."' Id. at 1446 n.2.
182. Id. at 1447-48 (footnotes omitted).
183. Id. at 1446.
184. Id. at 1458.
185. 740 F.2d at 1447.
186. See id. at 1451.
187. Id.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 1451 n.14.
See id. at 1452.
See id. at 1455.
740 F.2d at 1468 (Wallace, J. concurring).
192. Id. at 1452.
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outcome. 193 In the end, the court determined that even safety considerations need to be
"truly unusual factors" or "unique problems" in order to justify the rejection of a nonparkland alternative. 194 Here, the Secretary argued that safety considerations justified
rejection of the alignment that did not use parkland. 195 These considerations included
more complex traffic movements and more dangerous and confusing ramp curves and
interchanges that were associated with the non-parkland alignment. 196 The court ruled,
in this case, that the record was insufficient to determine whether such safety issues
were "unique"--a considerable and additional hurdle for future projects to meet. 197
Turning to another matter that can often arise in § 4(f) litigation-reviewing a "nobuild" alternative-the court again strictly interpreted § 4(f) and established a stringent
requirement for reviewing alternatives. 198 The court stated that "[t]he mere fact that a
,need' for a highway has been 'established' does not prove that not to build the highway
' 19 9
would be 'imprudent' under Overton Park."
This statement makes it more difficult
to dismiss or discount a no-build alternative. By citing Overton Park, the court applied
the "truly unusual factors" and "unique problems" criteria that must be shown in order
to reject an alternative. 2 0 Moreover, "increased congestion or commuter delays" were
deemed to be not "so unusual or extraordinary that the No Build alternative must be
rendered imprudent. ' 2° 1 Thus, the court implies almost a presumption for the No Build
alternative, since congestion and commuter delays are often key factors in support of
building a new highway. In this particular case, the court ultimately held that the202
record
did not adequately support a finding that the No Build alternative was imprudent.

It should be noted, with respect to the No Build alternative discussion, that Judge
Wallace dissented on this issue. He argued that by insisting on a determination as to the
20 3
efficacy of a No Build alternative, the court was "confusing the purposes" of § 4(f).
Section 4(f) was not enacted as a threshold test on whether or not to build a project,
rather "Congress intended [§ 4(f)] to regulate which way a government constructed a
project ....204 Thus, according to Justice Wallace, the majority opinion
on this issue
20 5
"improperly interferes with the cooperative system" of highway building.

193. Id. at 1452-53.
194. Id. at 1453.
195. See id. at 1452-53.
196. See id.
at 1453.
197. 740 F.2d at 1453.
198. See id.
at1455.
199. Id.at1455 n.21.
200. Id.at1455-56.
201. Id.at1456.
202. Id.at1457.
203. 740 F.2d at1468 (Wallace, J. concurring).
204. Id. Judge Wallace maintained that "[o]ther laws such as [the National Environmental Policy Act]
guide that first choice and include consideration of complete No Build alternatives." Id.
205. Id. The cooperative system refers to the joint federal, state and local role in transportation project
development.
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3. DruidHills Civic Association v. FederalHighway Administration-iIth Circuit
In Druid Hills Civic Association v. Federal Highway Administration,20 6 the 11th
Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated a proposed highway project in Atlanta, Georgia, part
of which would impact the Druid Hills Historic District. 20 7 The plaintiff/appellant, the
Druid Hills Civic Association, argued that the project was barred under § 4(f). 20820 9The
district court had denied an earlier motion to enjoin the construction of the project.
As with the previous cases, in fact as with virtually every § 4(f) case litigated after
Overton Park, its principles have served as a guide for the court. 210 The court restated
many of the views espoused in the LES and Stop H-3 cases 2 11 In particular, it noted
that "[a]n alternate route that also impacts upon parks and historic sites is not an
'alternative to the use' of such property."' 2 12 The court also made clear that there are
"no exceptions to the requirement that there be no prudent alternatives to the use of
parks and historic sites before the Secretary can approve a project using protected
properties."' 2 13 Again, this "no exceptions" language speaks to the stringency which
some circuits, such as the 11 th Circuit, have applied to § 4(f) cases.
In the end, the court remanded the case to the Secretary so that additional and more
adequate findings could be made as to the issue of whether the chosen alignment
properly comported with § 4(f) requirements. 2 14 In its directive to the Secretary, the
court noted that the review should "address the quantity of harm that will accrue to the
park or historic site and the nature of that harm, e.g., visual impact or physical
taking."' 2 15 The court continued on to note that "[i]t will not suffice to simply state that
an alternative route would affect 4(f) properties without providing some rational,
documented basis for such a conclusion. ' 216 Such thorough stringency is' 2 the
"command of Overton Parkand LES II and we are not free to ignore that directive. 17
IV. EXPLORING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH INTERPRETATIONS
The Department of Transportation, the FHWA and DOT's other modal
administrations obviously carefully scrutinize the judicial interpretations of § 4(f) to
assist them with their own application of § 4(f). Over the years, DOT has issued several
guidance and policy documents to help explain, interpret and contribute to the
understanding of § 4(f). 2 18 It has also promulgated regulations 2 19 regarding this

206. 772 F.2d 700 (11 th Cir. 1985).
207. Id. at 704.
208. Id.

209. Id. at 708.
210. See id. at 714.
211. See id. at 714-15.
212. 772 F.2d at 715 (citing La. Envtl. Soc'y, 537 F.2d at 85).
213. Id. at 716.

214. Id. at 718.
215. Id.

216. Id.
217. Id. at 719.

218. See generally 4(f) Policy Paper 1989, supra note 48.
219. See, e.g., 23 C.F.R. § 771.135 (2004).
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section, as well as established a nationwide § 4(f) permit program. 22 The discussion
below will review the key DOT regulations, guidance documents, and programs that
serve to help implement the directives of § 4(f).
A. Section 4( Regulations
In the 1980's, DOT issued a regulation that provides additional substantive details
and procedural guidance on § 4(f). 221 One of the main substantive provisions included
in the regulations is essentially a restatement of Overton Park principles, noting that the
"Administration" may not approve a project that uses protected lands unless "there are
unique problems or unusual factors involved" with such use or if "the cost, social,
economic, and environmental impacts, or community disruption" of such use rises to
"extraordinary magnitudes. ' 222 However, the regulations do stipulate that some uses
may not invoke § 4(f) protections. For example, if the site being used is "not
significant" based on a determination by officials who have jurisdiction over the park,
recreation area or refuge, then § 4(f) review is not required. 223 Also, the regulations
recognize that certain "restoration, rehabilitation, or maintenance" activities of
transportation facilities that are on the National Register of Historic Places are not
subject to § 4(f). 224 Although, the regulations provide for some flexibility, they have
not yet adopted some of the broader, more balanced approaches discussed in such cases
225
as Eagle Foundation and Hickory Neighborhood.
In addition to an enunciation of the procedural requirements to be followed when
reviewing transportation projects under § 4(f), the regulations devote considerable
attention to defining and discussing the definition of "use" of a park, recreation area,
refuge, or historic area. 226 The regulations state that a "use" occurs when one of the
following occurs: "land is permanently incorporated into a transportation facility;" "a
temporary occupancy of land [occurs] that is adverse in terms of the statute's
preservationist purposes;" or when there is a "constructive use of land." 227 The term
"constructive use" is further defined as a use that "does not incorporate land from a
section 4(f) resource, but ...[whose] impacts are so severe that the protected activities,
features, or attributes that qualify a resource for protection under section 4(f) are
substantially impaired. ' 22 8 Several examples of constructive uses that trigger § 4(f)
requirements, as well as examples of activities that are not subject to § 4(f), are also
provided in the regulations. 229 As would be expected, the above definitions and the
examples tend to track the body of § 4(f) case law.

220. 52 Fed. Reg. 31,1111 (1987).
221. See generally 23 C.F.R. § 771.135.
222. 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(a)(2).
223. 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(c).
224. 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(f).
225. Compare Eagle Found., 813 F.2d 798 with Hickory Neighborhood, 910 F.2d 159 (the courts
discussed a more flexible balancing approach in evaluating transportation projects under § 4(f)). See also
supra Part 1I.B.1-2.
226. See 23 C.F.R. § 77 1.135 (p).
227. 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(p)(1)(i)-(iii).
228. 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(p)(2).
229. See 23 C.F.R. § 77 1.135 (p)(4 )-(7).
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B. Section 46) Policy Paper
In addition to promulgating § 4(f) regulations, the FHWA also issued a detailed
policy paper that is often cited in § 4(f) cases. 23 This policy paper serves as a reference
document for § 4(f), and the stated purpose of the paper is to delineate FHWA's policy
positions that it adopted as a result of "court interpretations and many years of projectby-project applications." 23 1 It should be noted that this paper "addresses only the
programs and activities administered by FHWA." 232 Nevertheless, it presents a useful
(although legally non-binding) compendium of § 4(f) information.
The policy paper cites the Overton Park "unique problems" standard that must be
adhered to when reviewing a project alternative in light of § 4(f). 233 In general, the
policy paper also closely follows the regulations. However, it does differ from the
regulations in one significant manner. The policy paper recognizes an important gloss
to the strict Overton Park standard-the "cumulation of problems" approach that was
articulated in Eagle Foundation.234 The paper specifically notes the following:
When making a finding that an alternative is not feasible and prudent, it is not

necessary to show that any single factor presents unique problems. Adverse factors
such as environmental impacts, safety and geometric problems, decreased traffic
235
service, increased costs, and any other factors may be considered collectively.
This difference between the regulations and the policy paper reflects a split of sorts
within the DOT.
On March 1, 2005, FHWA released an updated § 4(f) policy paper that attempts to
reconcile some of the apparent splits among the judicial circuits and the section 4(f)
regulatory scheme. 236 This new policy document appears to provide additional
flexibility to the application and administration of § 4(f), although FHWA notes that it
is merely advisory. 237 Specifically, the new policy statement also notes that:
An alternative may be rejected as not prudent for any of the following reasons:
1. It does not meet the project purpose and need,

2. It involves extraordinary operational or safety problems,

230. See 4(f) Policy Paper 1989, supra note 48. This paper was issued on September 24, 1987 and then
re-issued as a revised edition on June 7, 1989.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. See also EagleFound., 813 F.2d at 805.
235. § 4(f) Policy Paper 1989, supra note 48.
236. § 4(f) Policy Paper, Fed. Highway Admin. (March 1, 2005), available at http://environment.fhwa.
dot.gov/projdev/4fpolicy.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2005) [hereinafter 4(f) Policy Paper 2005]. This new
policy paper supersedes the 1989 policy paper.
237. See id. See also Amy Phillips, PractitionersSee New FHWA Interpretationon Alternatives Selection
UnderSection 40l, Transportation Watch (BNA) March 24, 2005.
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3. There are unique problems of truly unusual factors present with it,
4. It results in unacceptable and severe adverse social, economic or other
environmental impacts,
5. It would cause extraordinary community disruption,
6. It has additional construction costs of an extraordinary magnitude, or
7. There is an accumulation of factors that collectively, rather than
impacts that present unique problems or reach
individually, have adverse
238
extraordinary magnitudes.
These additional statements suggest that FHWA is providing additional flexibility under
the § 4(f) program, and the need for further legislative clarification remains in order to
help sort out the precise meaning and application of § 4(f) that exists in today's
transportation and environmental policy realm.
C. Nationwide § 469 Evaluations and Approvals
While no statutory changes have been made to § 4(f) since the 1983 and 1987
recodifications and modifications, one significant development did occur in how the
FHWA implements its responsibilities under § 4(f). In 1987, FHWA issued guidelines
that allowed for the "expedited approval of those federally-aided highway projects
having 'minor involvement' with historic sites, public parks, recreation lands, and
wildlife and waterfowl refuges. ' 239 These guidelines are similar to other "nationwide"
permit programs used by the Army Corps of Engineers and other agencies in the
implementation of the Clean Water Act, 24 and they allow agencies a degree of
efficiency in carrying out regulatory mandates. If a particular project or program meets
the conditions spelled out by the FHWA, then that project or program is deemed to be
in compliance with the requirements of § 4(f).24 1 For example, in determining whether
a project qualifies for a nationwide permit, the FHWA will examine conditions that
"relate to the type of project, the severity of impacts to Section 4(f) property, the
evaluation of alternatives, the establishment of a procedure for minimizing harm to the
Section 4(f) property and adequate coordination with appropriate entities." 242 In effect,
the FHWA will conduct a balancing test for the approval of a nationwide permit.

238. 4(f) Policy Paper 2005, supra note 236.
239. FederalHighway Administration Adopts Expedited Approval Processfor Highway Projects Having
"Minor Involvement" with Historic Sites, 6 PRESERVATION LAW REPORTER Nos. I & 2, at 1002,
(Spring/Summer 1987) (citing 52 Fed. Reg. 31,111 (1987)).
240. See 33 U.S.C. § 404 (2000) (establishing the requirements for the creation of a permitting program
for the discharge of dredged or fill materials into waters of the United States). For a general overview on the
permitting process under the Clean Water Act, see Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: An Overview,
availableat http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/facts/factlO.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
241. See 6 PRESERVATION LAW REPORTER Nos. 1 & 2, at 1002.
242. 4(f) Policy Paper 1989, supra note 48.
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The FHWA has approved nationwide programmatic evaluations for projects in four
major areas: "(1) Independent Walkway and Bikeway Construction Projects; (2)
Historic Bridges; (3) Minor Involvements with Historic Sites; and (4) Minor
243
Involvements with Parks, Recreation Areas and Waterfowl and Wildlife Refuges."
The FHWA is quick to note that qualifying for one of the programmatic evaluations
"does not relax the Section 4(f) standards; i.e., it is just as difficult to justify using
Section 4(f) land with a programmatic Section 4(f) evaluation as it is with an individual
Section 4(f) evaluation." 244 Despite this declaration, these programmatic guidelines, at
their inception, were controversial and viewed as a potential erosion of the protections
afforded by § 4(f). 245 However, this view is not universally held, with many in the
transportation community viewing such guidelines as a responsible and efficient method
for ensuring compliance with § 4(f). And, since the guidelines specifically do not relax
the scope or application of § 4(f), some may argue that § 4(f) is still too stringently
interpreted and implemented.
D. Executive Order 13274-EnvironmentalStewardship and Transportation
InfrastructureProjectReviews
Responding to pressure from the transportation community as well as recognizing a
need to expedite the environmental review process, President George W. Bush issued
Executive Order 13274 on September 18, 2002, aimed at streamlining the transportation
project review process. 246 This executive order directed agencies to "take appropriate
actions ... to promote environmental stewardship in the Nation's transportation system
and expedite environmental reviews of high-priority transportation infrastructure
projects."' 247 In addition, the order called on the Secretary of Transportation to
"implement administrative, policy, and procedural mechanisms that enable each agency
...to

conduct environmental reviews [and] ...to ensure completion of such reviews in
248

a timely and environmentally responsible manner."
The order also required the Secretary to "designate" a list of "high-priority
249
transportation infrastructure projects that should receive expedited agency reviews,"

243. U.S. Department. of Transportation, Nationwide Section 4(f) Programmatic Evaluations, availableat
http://environment.fhwa.dot.gov/projdev/4fnspeval.htm. (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
244. 4(f) Policy Paper 1989, supra note 48.
245. See id. ("The National Trust for Historic Preservation opposed adoption of the expedited procedures,
finding that they improperly redefined and diluted federal law, which had been enacted to ensure protection of

historic and environmentally sensitive properties from ill-conceived federal actions. The National Trust and
six national environmental organizations submitted comments on December 18, 1986, urging Secretary of
Transportation Elizabeth H. Dole to reconsider approval of the guidelines. The organizations joining the
National Trust included the Sierra Club, the National Parks and Conservation Association, the National
Wildlife Federation, Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, the National Association of Railroad Passengers, and the
Environmental Policy Institute.").
246. Exec. Order No. 13,274, 67 Fed. Reg. 59,449 (Sept. 18, 2002). See also J.L. Laws, Bush Orders
of Transportation Projects, E&E DAILY (Sept. 19, 2002)
available at http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/searcharchive/test-search-display.cgi?q=bush+orders+dot&file
=%2FEEDaily%2Fsearcharchive%2FDaily%2F2002%2FSeptl9%2F09190201.htm (last visited Mar. 16,
2005).

DOT to Streamline Environmental Reviews

247. Exec. Order No. 13,274 § 1, 3 C.F.R. § 250 (2003).

248. Id. § 2(a).
249. Id. § 2(c).
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and to establish a "Transportation Infrastructure Streamlining Task Force" to assist with
streamlining efforts, review projects, and to "identify and promote policies."' 25 0 It
should be noted that the order made no substantive changes to § 4(f), but the order was
clearly aimed at easing the review process within the confines of existing law. 25 1 To
that extent, its direct impact on § 4(f) is difficult to determine. However, like the
legislative actions that are detailed below (particularly those occurring in the 107th and
108th Congresses), the executive order was important in framing the § 4(f) debate and
in advancing the broader issue of the'need for reforms of the environmental review
processes. The efforts directed by the executive order also proved to be successful
according to the DOT. 252 This success also helped build the case that environmental
streamlining initiatives make sense and should be expanded, thus setting the stage
for
253
the transportation reauthorization process that is discussed in more detail below.
E. Bush Administration TEA-21 ReauthorizationProposal
The most recent Bush Administration response to § 4(f) came as part of its
comprehensive legislative proposal to reauthorize TEA-2 1.254 The Administration's
TEA-21 reauthorization proposal, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient
Transportation Equity Act of 2003 (known as SAFETEA), served as a starting point for
the reauthorization debate. It established broad transportation policy principles
important to the Administration, as well as details on how to effectuate those
policies. 255
The House and Senate committees of jurisdiction received the
Administration proposal and used it as a reference
point during the drafting stages for
256
proposals.
reauthorization
TEA-21
own
their
Indicating the importance that the Administration placed on § 4(f) reform, the
SAFETEA proposal included a separate and specific section dedicated to § 4(f) reform.
It proposed essentially an entirely new § 4(f):

250. Id. § 3.
251. See id. The order repeatedly notes that actions taken with respect to the order be "in compliance with
applicable law" or "consistent with available resources and applicable laws." Id. at §§ 3 and 2(c). See also id.
§ 6 ("This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the Federal Government and is not
intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity
by a party against the United States, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities or entities, its officers or
employees, or any other person.").
252. Amy Phillips, Transportation:Officials Say Year-Old Effort to Streamline TransportationProjects
Considered a Success, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 185, Sept. 24., 2003, at A- I1 ("[F]our of the
13 projects.., designated for priority attention under the executive order now are moving forward ... .
253. Id.
254. The Safe, Accountable, Flexible and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003, available at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reauthorization/safeteabill.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2005) [hereinafter President's
Bill]. For additional information on TEA-21 reauthorization, see Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient
Transportation Equity Act of 2004, S. 1072, 108th Cong. (2003); Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for
Users, H.R. 3550, 108th Cong. (2003).
255. See President's Bill, supra note 254.
256. The Senate introduced the President's TEA-21 reauthorization proposal as the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003, S. 1072, 10 8th Cong. (2003) on May 15, 2003.
This bill became the vehicle for later Senate proceedings. The House introduced the President's proposal as
the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003, H.R. 2088, 108"h Cong.
(2003) on May 14, 2003. This bill was later supplanted by H.R. 3550 which was to become the vehicle for
the House's consideration of TEA-21 reauthorization.
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Section 303 of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

§ 303. Policy on lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites
(a) It is the policy of the United States Government that special effort should be
made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and
recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites.
(b) The Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate and consult, when
appropriate, with the Secretaries of the Interior, Housing and Urban
Development, and Agriculture, and with the States, in developing
transportation plans and programs that include measures to maintain or enhance
the natural beauty of lands crossed by transportation activities or facilities.
(c)(1) The Secretary of Transportation may approve a transportation program or
project requiring the use of publicly owned land of a public park, recreation
area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local significance,
or land of a historic site of national, State, or local significance (as determined
by the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction over the park, area,
refuge or site) only if(A) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to using that land, and
(B) the program or project includes all possible planning to minimize
harm to the park, recreation area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or
historic site resulting from the use.
(2) In making approvals under this subsection, the Secretary shall apply the
following standards:
(A) The Secretary may eliminate an alternative as infeasible if the
Secretary finds that the alternative cannot be implemented as a matter of
sound engineering.
(B) The Secretary shall consider the following when determining whether
it would be prudent to avoid the use of land of a resource subject to
preservation under this section:
(i) The relative significance of the land of the resource being
protected.
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(ii) The views of the official or officials with jurisdiction over the
land.
(iii) The relative severity of the adverse effects on the protected
activities, attributes, or features that qualify a resource for
protection.
(iv) The ability to mitigate adverse effects.
(v) The magnitude of the adverse effects that would result from the
selection of an alternative that avoids the use of the land of the
resource.
(C) A mitigation measure or mitigation alternative under paragraph
(c)(1)(B) of this section is possible if it is feasible and prudent. In
evaluating the feasibility and prudence of a mitigation measure or
mitigation alternative under paragraph (c)(1)(B) of this section, the
Secretary shall be governed by the standards of paragraphs (c)(2)(A) and
(B) of this subsection.
(d) The requirements of this section do not apply to(1) a project for a park road, parkway, or refuge road under section 204
of title 23; or
(2) a highway project on land administered by an agency of the Federal
government, when the purpose of the project is to serve or enhance the
values for which the land would otherwise be protected under this
section, as jointly determined by the Secretary of Transportation and the
head of the appropriate Federal land managing agency.
(e) The requirements of this section are deemed to be satisfied where the
treatment of an historic site (other than a National Historic Landmark) has been
agreed upon in accordance with Section 106 of the National Historic
Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. § 470f). The Secretary, in consultation with the
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, shall develop administrative
procedures to review the implementation of this subsection to ensure that the
objectives of the National Historic Preservation Act are being met.
(f)(1) The Secretary may approve a request by a State to provide funds made
available under chapter 1 of title 23, United States Code, to a State historic
preservation office, Tribal historic preservation office, or to the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation to provide the resources necessary to expedite
the historic preservation review and consultation process under section 303 of
title 49 and under section 470f of title 16, United States Code.
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(2) The Secretary shall encourage States to provide such funding to State
historic preservation officers, Tribal historic preservation officers or the
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation where the investment of such funds
will accelerate completion of a project or classes of projects or programs by
reducing delays in historic preservation review and consultation.
(3) Such requests under paragraph (1) shall be approved only for the additional
amounts that the Secretary determines are necessary for a State historic
preservation office, Tribal historic preservation office, or the Advisory Council
on Historic Preservation to expedite the review and consultation process and
only where the Secretary determines that such additional amounts will permit
completion of the historic preservation process in less than the time customarily
257
required for such process.
The Administration's new § 4(f) proposal is notable in a number of respects.
Although it does not do away with the "feasible and prudent" requirements that have
been a part of § 4(f) since its inception, it does adopt a veritable balancing test similar to
the approaches articulated in Eagle Foundation and its progeny. 258 It also allows for §
106 of the National Historic Preservation Act 259 to be used in place of § 4(f)
requirements for historic sites. Finally, the Secretary is authorized to provide funds to
state historic preservation agencies to speed up the completion of reviews. 26 0 The
major thrust of these provisions is to provide flexibility to the Secretary and provide
him or her with a menu of options to consider and use when evaluating a project under
§ 4(f) principles.
Draft explanatory report language accompanying the SAFETEA proposal also
provides additional, key details on the Administration proposal. 261 The explanatory
language notes that the new § 4(f) language "would facilitate the [§ 4(f) evaluation]
process by taking into consideration court decisions affecting the applicability of
'section 4(f)' and codifying those factors that would more efficiently allow a prudent
decision." 262 As justification for making these proposed changes, the Administration
notes that the current highway program has shifted away from new construction and
development and toward "system preservation and modernization, in which existing
263
facilities are the focus."
The SAFETEA report also notes that "[t]he rigid rules for applying 'section 4(f)'
spawned from the early court decisions [and] are often an awkward fit for the majority
of situations faced today, where consequences to 'section 4(f)' properties are usually
not as extreme. ' 264 The Administration also cited cases such as Eagle Foundationand
Hickory Neighborhood as examples of "some later court decisions [that] injected

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

President's Bill, supranote 254 § 1604.
See generally Eagle Found., 813 F.2d 798. See also SAFETEA DOT Analysis, supra note 12.
See National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 et seq. (2000).
See President's Bill, supra note 254 § 1604.
See generally SAFETEA DOT Analysis, supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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greater flexibility in interpreting 'section 4(f).- ' 265 It also referred to other cases that
have not been as flexible in their interpretation of § 4(f. 2 6 6 These differences in
approaches and interpretations among some of the circuit courts of appeal has caused a
"disparity" that "has made it difficult to find a workable national standard to use in
' 267
reaching determinations of whether an alternative is prudent and feasible."
Therefore, according to SAFETEA, a reform of § 4(f) is needed "to establish more
national uniformity, and [to be] consistent with the changed impacts of the highway
' 26 8
program."
V. EXPLORING RECENT LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS
Against the backdrop of over forty years of judicial and administrative
interpretation, actions during recent sessions of Congress have increasingly focused
269
their attention to § 4(f), with many influential committee leaders calling for reform.
The following discussion examines the recent legislative actions regarding § 4(f) with a
specific emphasis on the developments that have occurred in 2003 and 2004 during the
protracted and continuing reauthorization of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st
Century ("TEA-21"). As will be seen, the calls for reform of the § 4(f) requirements
have been bipartisan. Additional support for change has also come from many in the
transportation community, while many in the environmental and preservation
270
communities have lined up to oppose these reform efforts.
A. H.R. 5455-ExPDITEACT
During the 107th Congress, as the House and Senate began the initial TEA-21
reauthorization process, Chairman Don Young (R-AK) of the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee launched one of the first dedicated efforts aimed at
"streamlining" the environmental review processes that govern transportation
projects. 27 1 This effort included the introduction of legislation, the Expediting Project
Delivery To Improve Transportation and the Environment Act ("ExPDITE"), aimed at
streamlining highway and transit projects, as well as a hearing 272 on issues and
problems with the current environmental review processes for transportation projects.
These actions helped lay the groundwork for later, more specific actions regarding §
4(f) during TEA-21 reauthorization.

265. Id.
266. Id. at 28.
267. SAFETEA DOT Analysis, supra note 12.
268. Id.
269. See, e.g., Brian Friel, Pave or Preserve?, NAT'L J., Dec. 13, 2003 at 3732-33. Section 4(f) reform is
supported by Senator Inhofe (R-OK), Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, and
by Representative Don Young (R-AK), Chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.
Id. These committees have primary jurisdiction over § 4(f).
270. See, e.g., id. at 3732-36.
271. See, e.g., Expediting Project Delivery to Improve Transportation and the Environment Act, H.R.
5455, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter ExPDITE Act].
272. Expediting Project Delivery to Improve Transportationand the Environment Act: Hearing on H.R.
5455 Before the Subcomm. on Highways and Transit of the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure,

107th Cong. 1-2 (2002) [hereinafter ExPDITE Hearing].
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1. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Hearing
On October 8, 2002, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee held a
hearing on Chairman Don Young's ExPDITE legislation. The hearing was conducted
as part of the process to reauthorize TEA-21. 273 It included a variety of witnesses,
representing a spectrum of interests, including the following: American Association of
State Highway and Transportation Officials ("AASHTO"); American Road and
Transportation Builders Association ("ARTBA"); American Public Transportation
Association ("APTA"); American Highway Users Alliance; American Council of
Engineering Companies; Tri-State Transportation Campaign; Environmental Defense;
Defenders of Wildlife; Amalgamated Transit Union; and Natural Resources Defense
274
Council ("NRDC").
From the witnesses presenting testimony, a strong endorsement for the ExPDITE
bill and for reforming § 4(f) came from John Horsley, Executive Director of the
AASHTO.275 In his prepared statement, he noted that AASHTO views "§ 4(f) as one of
the greatest causes of delay" in the development and construction of transportation
projects. 276 He traced much of the problems with § 4(f) to the judicial interpretations
that "have accumulated over the past 30 years as a result of dozens of court decisions,"
277
and he specifically singled out Overton Parkas the source of much of the problems.
According to Horsley, the "extraordinary magnitude" and "unique problems" test
championed by Overton Park has "converted § 4(f) into an extremely rigid and
unyielding statute, which often leads to absurd results-where minor § 4(f) properties
are protected at great expense, with little lasting benefit to the community or the
278
environment."
As an example of the type of problems, costs and delays that a rigidly-interpreted §
4(f) causes, Horsley cited a project in Kentucky that cost the state one million dollars in
order to comply with the § 4(f) mandates. 279 In the Kentucky example, the state was
required to account and mitigate for an historic farmhouse in order to proceed with a
road project that required the taking of the farmhouse property. 28 In order to avoid the
farmhouse, the state chose an alignment that required the taking of a modem house;
both the farmhouse and the modem home were owned by the same person. 28 1 The
owner of the modem house used the money from the state compensation that was paid
to him in order to take the modem house and used it to demolish the historic farmhouse

273. See Memorandum from Chairman Don Young to the Members of the Subcomm. on Highways and
Transit, 1 (Oct. 8, 2002), available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/highway/10-08-02/10-0802memo.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2004) (on file with author). The memo notes that "[t]his hearing is the
sixteenth in a series on the reauthorization of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century." Id.
274. Id.
275. See ExPDITE Hearing, supra note 272, at 73-84 (statement of John Horsley, Executive Director,
Am. Assoc. of State Highway and Transp. Officials), available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/
highway/10-08-02/horsley.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Horsley Statement].
276. Id. at 80.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 80-81.
281. Horsley Statement, supra note 275, at 80-81.
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and ultimately move the modem house to the site of the historic farmhouse. 282 Thus, in
the end, one of the sole purposes of §4(f)-preserving historic property-actually
produced a result that destroyed historic property. This result, Horsley noted, is "not
' 283
unique, [with] similar stories... repeated in every state across the country."
In order to remedy these types of results, AASHTO argues that a legislative
solution is needed. 284 It would be "impossible for FHWA--even if it wanted to-to
override the case law through a rulemaking." 285 The AASHTO position is that "[o]nly
Congress has the power to get § 4(f) back on track and restore a degree of flexibility
286
and common sense."
Horsley articulated the AASHTO position on § 4(f) which "mirror[s] the elements
288
287
Four main elements comprise the suggestions for reform.
of the ExPDITE bill."
They include the following: (1) allowing projects to qualify for a finding of no
significant impact ("FONSI"); 289 (2) "eliminat[ing] the concept of 'extraordinary
magnitude' from the definition of prudence once and for all, and replace it with a more
balanced and flexible definition;" 290 (3) allowing the "substitution of Section 106
consultation under the National Historic Preservation Act for Section 4(f) compliance
for historic properties;" 29 1 and (4) permitting an "exemption of the Interstate Highway
System from treatment as a historic resource . . ,292
Representatives of the ARTBA 293 and the APTA 294 echoed AASHTO's support for
§ 4(f) reform. ARTBA's statement at the hearing concentrated on the delays that § 4(f)
compliance causes to transportation projects. In fact, according to a study cited by
ARTBA, § 4(f) is "the most common reason" for project delays. 295 Another reason that

282. Id. at 81.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 80.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Horsley Statement, supra note 275, at 80.
288. Id. at 80-81.
289. Id. at 80.
290. Id. at 80-81.
291. Id. at 81. The requirements of Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act are very similar
to those of § 4(f) and "if the Section 106 process results in a conclusion that satisfies the State Historic
Preservation Officer, and the federal Advisory Council on Historic Preservation if the Council is involved,
then Section 4(f) should be satisfied as a matter of law." Id. As AASHTO notes, such approach "would
provide an incentive for a more collaborative, problem-solving approach to historic resources, while reducing
the potential for bureaucratic wrangling and litigation over Section 4(f) findings." Horsley Statement, supra
note 275, at 81.
292. Such an exemption is necessary, according to AASHTO, because there are efforts underway to treat
the Interstate Highway System as historic property, and this outcome would make improvements to the
system subject to § 4(f). Id. If this were to happen, the necessary § 4(f) reviews "could generate new
paperwork burdens for every project on the Interstate system." Id.
293. See ExPDITE Hearing, supra note 272, at 61-72 (statement of Brian Holmes, Executive Director,
Maryland Highway Contractors Assoc. on behalf of the Am. Road & Transp. Builders Assoc.), available at
http://www.house.gov/transportation/highway/10-08-02/holmes.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005) [hereinafter
Holmes Statement].
294. See ExPDITE Hearing, supra note 272, at 110-115 (statement of William Millar, President, Am.
Public Transp. Assoc.), available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/highway/10-08-02/millar.htm (last
visited Mar. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Millar Statement].
295. Holmes Statement, supra note 293, at 65. A study by the National Cooperative Highway Research
Program found that § 4(f) requirements were cited most often (66%) as the culprit behind transportation
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ARTBA mentioned regarding § 4(f)'s rigidity is the fact that it "predates most other
federal environmental laws" and, thus has not had the historical precedent and
296
perspective from which some other, later environmental statutes have297benefited.
APTA's statement also reiterated the positions of AASHTO and ARTBA.
The pro-reform views were, however, not the only views voiced during the hearing.
Representatives from the environmental community uttered their own positions and
criticisms of the ExPDITE legislation. 298 Speaking for the Defenders of Wildlife,
William Snape, the organization's Vice President and Chief Counsel, took issue with
the claims of AASHTO and others. 299 He cited studies concluding that reasons other
than environmental regulations were often the cause for project delays. 3 0 Snape was
also particularly concerned about §103 of the ExPDITE bill that proposed a number of
changes to § 4(f).30 1 On behalf of the Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC"),
Deron Lovaas also presented testimony critical of proposals to reform § 4(f). 302 Like
Snape, Lovaas offered information contrary to AASHTO's data regarding the causes of
transportation project delays. 30 3 On the issue of § 4(t) reform, he noted that the
ExPDITE legislation "stacks the deck in favor of the Secretary of Transportation's
by re-defining "prudent" and "feasible," thus hampering a search for
preferred projects
3 4
alternatives." 0
2. Bill Language
Upon introduction of H.R. 5455, Chairman Don Young (R-AK) talked about his
primary reasons for introducing the bill. He observed that "[s]tudies have clearly
outlined the problems associated with America's growing highway congestion crisis,
which in 1999 alone cost the nation $78 billion and led to the waste of 6.8 billion
gallons of gas . . .,305 The problems to which Chairman Young referred were project
create "social, economic and environmental problems
delays--delays that, he30argues,
6
throughout our nation."

project delays. Id.
296. Id. at 70.
297. See Millar Statement, supra note 294, at 115.
298. See generally ExPDITE Hearing, supra note 272.
299. See ExPDITE Hearing, supra note 272, at 129-49 (statement of William Snape, Vice President and
Chief Counsel, Defenders of Wildlife), available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/highway/10-0802/snape.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
300. Id. at 130. One study cited by Snape indicated the top reasons for project delay were "lack of
funding or low priority," "local controversy," or "the inherent complexity of the project." Id.
301. Id. at 132-33. For a more detailed discussion of the bill's proposed changes, see infra Part V.A.
302. See ExPDITE Hearing, supra note 272, at 106-09 (statement of Deron Lovaas, Deputy Director of
the Smart Growth and Transp. Program, Natural Res. Def. Council), available at http://www.house.gov/
transportation/highway/10-08-02/lovaas.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
303. See id. at 107.
304. Id. at 109.
305. Press Release, U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Environmental
Streamlining Legislation Introduced in U.S. House; Bill Would Expedite High Priority Projects & Protect
Environmental Laws (Sept. 26, 2002), available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/press/press2002/
release362.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
306. Id.
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To tackle the problem of project delays, H.R. 5455 proposes a number of revisions
to environmental law that affect transportation projects. 30 7 Specifically, in the area of §
4(f), the bill makes significant changes. First-and perhaps most significantly-it
replaces the current statutory § 4(f) framework with a more flexible and balanced
approach.308 Section 103(c) of the bill rewrites the §4(f) requirements by mandating
that "the Secretary shall not approve any transportation project. . that has a significant
impact on a protected resource." ' 30 9 "Significance of impact" is to be determined by
comprehensively, taking into account (A) the value of the protected resource; (B) the
value of the impacted land within the protected resource; (C) the nature and extent of
the impact on the protected resource after mitigation, measured both quantitatively
and qualitatively and; (D) the views of the official with jurisdiction over the protected
of private property, the views of the principal owner or
resource, and, in the case
3 10
owners of the property.

This approach stands in sharp contrast to the Overton Park § 4(f) approach, as it
specifically allows for a balancing of various issues and interests in making a
determination as to whether a transportation project will impact a protected land.
The ExPDITE legislation also further attempts to streamline the approval of
projects under § 4(f) by requiring the issuance of regulations "listing categories of
projects that do not have the potential to cause significant impacts on protected
resources." 311 This provision is similar to the nationwide programmatic evaluations
described above 312 except that it appears to expand the type of categories eligible for
such streamlined consideration. Again, the primary thrust of the ExPDITE legislation is
to provide the Secretary with more flexibility and discretion to approve projects when
considered against the totality of circumstances, and a categorical approval process
furthers that goal.
This theme of flexibility also carries over to the provisions of ExPDITE that detail
3 13
If the Secretary finds that a proposed
how project alternatives are to be evaluated.
project will have a significant impact on a protected property, then he or she is required
to "develop and evaluate alternatives, as part of the alternatives analysis for the NEPA
3 14
the project."
process, if any, for avoiding, minimizing, and mitigating the impacts of
This provision helps ensure the proposed project moves forward in a timely manner by
linking its review to the NEPA process, thereby reducing overlap and redundant
evaluations.

307. See generally H.R. 5455, 107th Cong. (2002).
308. See H.R. 5455 § 103.

309. Id. § 103(c).
310. Id. § 103(d)(2).
311. Id. § 103(d)(3).
312. See supra Part IV.C.
313. H.R. 5455 § 103(e).
314. Id.
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The bill also sets forth standards to guide the Secretary in evaluating and selecting
alternatives. 3 15 Taking a cue from the current § 4(f) language, section 103(f) states the
Secretary may approve a project if:
(1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative that would entirely avoid significant
impacts on the protected resource; (2) there is no prudent and feasible alternative that
would substantially reduce significant impacts on the protected resource when
compared to the selected alternative; and (3) appropriate measures to minimize the
harm to the protected resource have been incorporated into the selected
6
31

alternative.

The above language, however, differs significantly from current law. First, an
alternative must "entirely avoid" significant impacts. Second, the "unique problems"
standard is seemingly removed from the "prudent and feasible alternatives"
consideration as the alternatives, now, need only "substantially reduce" impacts in order
to be chosen. 317 And, third, the "all possible planning" requirement under the
minimization of harms subsection of § 4(f) is replaced by a less strenuous requirement
3 18
to take "appropriate measures" to minimize harm.
In an apparent attempt to address the "problems" of Overton Park mentioned by
AASHTO and others, the bill prescribes specific factors that must be assessed when
determining the feasibility and prudence of a particular alternative. 319 An alternative is
not "feasible" if the "alternative cannot be implemented as a matter of sound
engineering." 32° In addition, an alternative is deemed not "prudent" if "the Secretary
finds that the drawbacks associated with that alternative clearly and substantially
outweigh its benefits. ' 321 The ExPDITE bill underscores the need for balancing by
directing the Secretary to
assess the benefits and drawbacks of the alternative as a whole, taking into account
the alternative's ability to achieve the project's objectives, the environmental and
other impacts of the alternative (including the impacts on protected resources), the
322
cost of the alternative, and any other factors deemed relevant by the Secretary.
While the definition of "feasible" is clearly derived from Overton Park,323 the
definition of "prudent" draws heavily from the balancing discussion in Eagle
Foundation.324 The drafters of ExPDITE have stitched together key elements from two

315. Id.§ 103(f).
316. Id. § 103(f)(1)-(3).
317. Compare H.R. 5455 § 103(0(2) with 49 U.S.C § 303(c)(2) (2000).
318. Compare H.R. 5455 § 103(0(3) with 49 U.S.C § 303(c)(2) (2000).
319. H.R. 5455 § 103(g).
320. Id. § 103(g)(1).
321. Id. § 103(g)(2).
322. Id.
323. See Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411 (1971). For a project to be "feasible," it must be found
by the Secretary to be so "as a matter of sound engineering." Id.
324. See Eagle Found. v. Dole, 813 F.2d 798, 804 (1987) (noting that a review concerning a project's
prudence, "calls for judgment, for balancing ... ").
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cases that have offered differing interpretations on the scope of § 4(f) to produce a
middle ground. They have also given the Secretary additional discretion by allowing
him or her to take into account factors as "relevant" in determining a project's
prudence.

32 5

Finally, ExPDITE proposes one additional change to the § 4(f) review process,
while also keeping-with minor modification-a key provision of § 4(f). In § 103(h),
the bill allows compliance with § 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act to be
substituted for compliance with the other provisions of H.R. 5455 when the protected
property at issue is an historic property. 326 H.R. 5455, however, provides a key
exception to the § 106 compliance substitution provision. Sections 103(i)-O) of H.R.
5455 state that "any direct physical impact" or "any visual, audible, or atmospheric
impact" by the proposed project on a national historic landmark will be deemed
"adverse" to the landmark and shall not be approved by the Secretary. 327 The bill
maintains the definition of protected properties (which it calls "protected resource[s]")
but with one minor modification. 328 Under the bill, historic properties are defined as
those that are deemed historic under the National Historic Preservation Act,329 as
opposed to "historic site[s] of national, State, or local significance (as 33determined
by the
0
Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction over the ... site)."
Therefore, the bill, by not substantially changing the definition of protected
properties maintains the overall policy established by Congress in 1966 of protecting
valuable parklands, wildlife refuges and historic sites from encroachment by
transportation projects. However, under the bill, the Secretary is now given the
flexibility and balance that Members of Congress sought when originally enacting §
4(f). 311 Ultimately, the 107th Congress came to an end without H.R. 5455 moving
forward beyond the hearing stage, but the principles it outlined were to play an
important role in the reauthorization of TEA-21 as will be seen below.
B. S. 3031-MEGA Act

During the 107th Congress, the Senate also joined the debate on environmental
streamlining with the introduction of S. 3031, the Maximum Economic Growth for
America Through Environmental Streamlining Act ("MEGA"). 332 The bill's sponsor,
Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), during the introduction of the bill, discussed the goal of
the bill: provide for environmental streamlining. 333 Environmental streamlining is
needed to "make the [environmental] permit and approval process work more smoothly

325. See H.R. 5455 § 103(g)(2).
326. Id. § 103(h). For an example of reviews involving historic properties, § 106 of the National Historic
Preservation Act is deemed to be equivalent and/or redundant to a traditional § 4(f) review, see Horsley
Statement, supra note 275.
327. H.R. 5455 § 103(i)-(j).
328. Id. § 1030)(3).
329. Id. §103(j)(3)(B).
330. 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2000).
331. See supra Part 11.B.2.
332. S. 3031, 107th Cong. (2002).
333. 148 CONG. REc. S9,850 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus concerning the
introduction of the MEGA Act).
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and effectively." 334 The bill was introduced in large part due to Senator Baucus'
frustration with the DOT's regulations that were promulgated as part of the
requirements of TEA-21. 335 As Senator Baucus noted, "[t]hose regulations 336 were
supposed to help the State DOTS get their jobs done better and more efficiently-not
make their jobs harder."' 337 The proposed regulations required by TEA-21 received a
338
number of comments-many of which were negative, according to Baucus.
Ultimately, Baucus noted, DOT "went back to the drawing board and we never heard
339
from them again" through two different Administrations.
While MEGA focuses primarily on "streamlining" the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA") process, it also addresses § 4(f) issues. 34 Section 2(a) of the bill
authorizes state environmental reviews in lieu of DOT reviews to meet the requirements
of various environmental laws, including § 4(f). 3 4 1 This provision, which is similar to
the manner in which other environmental laws are administered (for example, the Clean
Air Act), 342 allows individual states to assume responsibility for conducting the review
34 3
process for certain projects, provided the state can capably carry out such review.
The rationale behind this approach is that states will be able to respond more nimbly to
local needs and issues than the federal government, and can therefore more quickly
344
move a project through the review process.
The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee held a hearing on this bill
and, as with the hearing on the House ExPDITE legislation, a variety of transportation
groups were represented at the hearing. 345 Again, the testimony on behalf of AASHTO
was pivotal and supportive of § 4(f) reforms. 346 AASHTO made it clear that § 4(f)

334. Id.
335. Id.
336. See NEPA and Related Procedures for Transportation Decisionmaking, Protection of Public Parks,
Wildlife and Waterfowl Refuges, and Historic Sites, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,960 (proposed May 25, 2000). The
proposed rule was received with controversy and as a result was later withdrawn on September 20, 2002. See
67 Fed. Reg. 59,225 (Sept. 20, 2002).
337. 148 CONG. REC. S9,850 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2002).
338. See id.
339. Id.
340. Maximum Economic Growth for America Through Environmental Streamlining Act, S.3031 107th
Cong. § 2(a) (2002). See also 148 CONG. REC. S9,850 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
Senator Baucus discusses the three main purposes of MEGA.
First, the USDOT needs to be the lead agency on at least two requirements, 'Purpose and Need' for
a project and 'Scope of Alternatives.' This will make sure that any stalemates are resolved
quickly. Second, we should allow States to take over the role of the USDOT if they can meet
certain requirements and if they choose to take on that role. This will eliminate another step of
bureaucracy. Last, we must ensure that resource agencies act in a timely manner. When it comes
time for an agency like Fish and Wildlife to assess the extent of damage (if any) to a wetlands or
the Army Corps of Engineers to issue a permit, these agencies shouldn't be able to take years to
make these decisions.
Id.
341. S. 3031 § 2(a).
342. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000).
343. S. 3031 § 2(a).
344. See 148 Cong. Rec. S9,850 (2002).
345. See "Project Delivery and Environmental Stewardship": Progress on Environmental Streamlining
Under TEA-21: Hearing on S. 3031 Before the Sen. Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works, available at
http://epw.senate.gov/stml-107.htm#09-19-02 (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
346. See "Project Delivery and Environmental Stewardship": Progress on Environmental Streamlining
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reform must be addressed during TEA-21 reauthorization. 347 "The core problem with §
4(f)," AASHTO noted, "is a lack of flexibility, balance, and common sense." 348 A
stringently interpreted § 4(f) causes the DOT to be "in the position of protecting a minor
historic property at the expense of other, more sensitive environmental resources or
communities." 349 Moreover, such strict interpretations "undermine not only the
credibility of individual decision-makers or agencies, but of the NEPA process as a
whole." 350 In order to address these problems, AASHTO restated many of its positions
that it articulated during the House ExPDITE hearing, namely that § 4(f) be amended to
allow exemptions for "projects that have 'no significant impact' on Section 4[f9
lands." 35'
This hearing was important to advancing the concept of environmental
streamlining. It also signaled that the issue of § 4(f) reform was receiving bipartisan
support. 352 The bill and the hearing also helped set the stage for addressing the issue of
§ 4(f) reform in TEA-21 reauthorization-a legislative issue that was to rise to high
prominence in the 108th Congress as will be seen in the next section.
C. S. 1072-SAFETEA
The Senate, through the leadership of Senator James Inhofe (R-OK), Chairman of
the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, initiated the first serious
congressional TEA-21 reauthorization efforts, with the introduction of S. 1072, the
Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003 on May
15, 2003. 353 This bill essentially served as a vehicle to introduce the Bush
Administration's TEA-21 reauthorization proposal. 354 However, the introduced bill did
not address the more controversial § 4(f) issues that were included in the President's
355
SAFETEA version.
The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee marked up S. 1072 on
November 12, 2003 and reported it from the committee with amendment. 3 56 This
committee-reported version was also silent on specific § 4(f) reforms. 357 The Senate

Under TEA-2 1: Hearing on S. 3031 Before the Sen. Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works (statement of Am. Assoc.
of State Highway and Transp. Agencies), available at http://epw.senate.gov/107th/AASHTO _091902.htm
(last visited Mar. 22, 2005) [hereinafter AASHTO Statement].
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. See, e.g., Maximum Economic Growth for America Through Environmental Streamlining Act, S.
3031 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2002). This bill was introduced by a Democrat and co-sponsored by six
Republicans.
353. S. 1072, 108th Cong. (2003).
354. See generally S. 1072. See also Amy Phillips, Senate Reauthorization Draft Offers Limited
Delegation, Sidesteps 4(l) Reforms, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 212, Nov. 3, 2003, at A-17. See
also supra Part 1V.E.
355. Phillips, supra note 354, at A17.
356. See S. 1072 Bill Summary and Status for the 108th Congress, availableat http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d108:SNO1072:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
357. See S. 1072. The committee reported bill contains a number of environmental streamlining
provisions, but does not include either the Bush Administration's § 4(f) reform proposals or other § 4(f)
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finally addressed the § 4(f) issues when it considered the bill on the floor in early
February 2004. 358 Senator Voinovich (R-OH), a member of the Senate Subcommittee
on Transportation and Infrastructure of the Committee on Environment and Public
Works, offered an amendment during the floor debate that specifically addressed the
issue of § 4(f) reforms. 359 Long a champion of § 4(f), Senator Voinovich offered this
amendment as a compromise, and the amendment was supported by the National Trust
360
for Historic Preservation and the AASHTO.
Senator Voinovich spoke at some length on his amendment, and he discussed the
importance of reforming § 4(f). His amendment allowed for a de minimis exception to
the provisions of § 4(f) for those transportation projects that have only minimal impacts
on § 4(f) protected lands. 36 1 It also provided an "incentive for projects' sponsors to
incorporate environmentally protective measures into a project from the beginning" so
that § 4(f) lands can be protected more efficiently. 362 He acknowledged that these
reforms are only a compromise and that "many groups would have preferred greater
363
reform," presumably even Senator Voinovich himself.
One of the primary reasons for offering the amendment was the need to harmonize
disparate federal courts of appeals' interpretations of § 4(f). 364 Senator Voinovich
noted that "inconsistent interpretation of the Overton criteria . . . [justifies] a more
balanced interpretation of [§ 4(f)'s] requirements." ' 365 Section 4(f), Senator Voinovich
argued, has become "a lawyer's dream and a nightmare for the courts that have to
interpret it and the States and U.S. Department of Transportation, which has to enforce
the law.' 366 This situation has resulted in "needless confusion, significant delays, and
' 367
high cost for issues that defy common sense."
To help illustrate his case for reform, Senator Voinovich offered several examples
of situations in which § 4(f) either failed in its purpose of protecting parklands, wildlife
refuges, or historic properties or resulted in greater cost or delay for the project at
issue. 368 He cited a case in Ohio where-because of § 4(f) requirements-a highway
had to be rerouted around a fifty-year-old barn at a cost of $100,000 and a delay of four
months. 369 The irony behind this particular case was that the "barn fell down due to

proposals.
358. See 150 CONG. REC. S393 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2004).
359. See 150 CONG. REC. S643 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2004) (statement of Sen. Voinovich concerning his §
4(f) amendment). See also 150 CoNG. REC. S671 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2004) (text of Senate Amendment 2271
offered by Senator Voinovich).
360. See 150 CONG. REC. S671.
361. Id. at S644.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at S643.
365. 150 CONG. REC. S643 (2004).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. at S643-44.
369. Id. at S643. Senator Voinovich noted that this case could be a harbinger of things to come because
the age of the barn-fifty years-was the trigger for the § 4(f) review and ensuing mitigation efforts. He
observed that "[s]oon, we won't be able to do any improvements because sidewalks will be fifty years old in
this country." Id.
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owner neglect a few years later."'370 In another example in Pennsylvania, he noted that
§ 4(f) requirements caused the destruction of a non-historic farm in order to save an
adjacent historic farm that, itself, was later developed. 371 Senator Voinovich argued
that his "amendment would at least have allowed the State preservation officer to make
and therefore
a balanced decision considering all of the information and alternatives,"
372
examples.
above
the
in
outcomes
the
prevented
likely
have
could
Senator Voinovich's amendment was ultimately incorporated into a larger
"manager's amendment" offered by Chairman Inhofe.373 The Senate adopted this
amendment-Senate Amendment 2285-on February 12, 2004. 374 Senate Amendment
2285, incorporating Senator Voinovich's amendment, made a number of changes to
existing § 4(f) law and policy. The text of Senate Amendment 2285 follows:

SEC. 1514. PARKS, RECREATION AREAS, WILDLIFE AND WATERFOWL
REFUGES, AND HISTORIC SITES.

(a) Programs and Projects with De Minimis Impacts(1) TITLE 23-Section 138 of title 23, United States Code, is amended(A) in the first sentence, by striking "It is hereby" and inserting the
following:
(a) Declaration of Policy-It is; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:

(b) De Minimis Impacts(1) Requirements
(A) IN GENERAL-The requirements of this section shall be considered to
be satisfied with respect to an area described in paragraph (2) or (3) if the
Secretary determines, in accordance with this subsection, that a
transportation program or project will have a de minimis impact on the
area.
(B) CRITERIA-In making any determination under this subsection, the
Secretary shall consider to be part of a transportation program or project
370. 150 CONG. REC. S643 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2004).
371. Id. at S644.
372. Id.
373. See 150 CONG. REC. S812 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2004).
374. See S. 1072 Bill Summary and Status for the 108th Congress, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-

bin/bdquery/z?d108:SNO1072:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
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any avoidance, minimization, mitigation, or enhancement measures that
are required to be implemented as a condition of approval of the
transportation program or project.
(2) HISTORIC SITES-With respect to historic sites, the Secretary may make a
finding of de minimis impact only if(A) the Secretary has determined, in accordance with the consultation
process required under section 106 of the National Historic Preservation
Act (16 U.S.C. § 470f), that(i) the transportation program or project will have no adverse effect
on the historic site; or
(ii) there will be no historic
transportation program or project;

properties

affected by the

(B) the finding of the Secretary has received written concurrence from
the applicable State historic preservation officer or tribal historic
preservation officer (and from the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation, if participating in the consultation); and
(C) the finding of the Secretary has been developed in consultation with
parties consulting as part of the process referred to in subparagraph (A).
(3) PARKS, RECREATION AREAS, AND WILDLIFE AND WATERFOWL REFUGESWith respect to parks, recreation areas, and wildlife or waterfowl refuges, the
Secretary may make a finding of de minimis impact only if(A) the Secretary has determined, in accordance with the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.) (including
public notice and opportunity for public review and comment), that the
transportation program or project will not adversely affect the activities,
features, and attributes of the park, recreation area, or wildlife or
waterfowl refuge eligible for protection under this section; and
(B) the finding of the Secretary has received concurrence from the
officials with jurisdiction over the park, recreation area, or wildlife or
waterfowl refuge.

(2) TITLE 49-Section 303 of title 49, United States Code, is amended(A) by striking (c) The Secretary and inserting the following:
(c) APPROVAL OF PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS.-Subject to subsection (d),
the Secretary; and
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(B) by adding at the end the following:
(d) De Minimis Impacts.(1) Requirements.(A) In General.-The requirements of this
considered to be satisfied with respect to an
paragraph (2) or (3) if the Secretary determines,
this subsection, that a transportation program or

section shall be
area described in
in accordance with
project will have a

de minimis impact on the area.
(B) Criteria .- In making any determination under this subsection,
the Secretary shall consider to be part of a transportation program
or project any avoidance, minimization, mitigation, or
enhancement measures that are required to be implemented as a
condition of approval of the transportation program or project.
(2) HISTORIC SITES.-With respect to historic sites, the Secretary
may make a finding of de minimis impact only if(A) the Secretary has determined, in accordance with the
consultation process required under section 106 of the National
Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470f), that(i) the transportation program or project will have no adverse effect
on the historic site; or
(ii) there will be no historic properties
transportation program or project;

affected

by the

(B) the finding of the Secretary has received written concurrence
from the applicable State historic preservation officer or tribal
historic preservation officer (and from the Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation, if participating in the consultation); and
(C) the finding of the Secretary has been developed in consultation
with parties consulting as part of the process referred to in
subparagraph (A).
(3)

PARKS, RECREATION AREAS, AND WILDLIFE AND WATERFOWL

respect to parks, recreation areas, and wildlife or
waterfowl refuges, the Secretary may make a finding of de minimis
impact only ifREFUGES.-With

(A) the Secretary has determined, in accordance with the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.)
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(including public notice and opportunity for public review and
comment), that the transportation program or project will not
adversely affect the activities, features, and attributes of the park,
recreation area, or wildlife or waterfowl refuge eligible for
protection under this section; and
(B) the finding of the Secretary has received concurrence from the
officials with jurisdiction over the park, recreation area, or wildlife
or waterfowl refuge.
(b)

CLARIFICATION OF EXISTING STANDARDS-

(1) IN GENERAL-Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this

Act, the Secretary shall (in consultation with affected agencies and
interested parties) promulgate regulations that clarify the factors to be
considered and the standards to be applied in determining the prudence
and feasibility of alternatives under section 138 of title 23 and section
303 of title 49, United States Code.
(2) REQuiREMENTS-The regulations(A) shall clarify the application of the legal standards to a variety
of different types of transportation programs and projects
depending on the circumstances of each case; and
(B) may include, as appropriate, examples to facilitate clear and
consistent interpretation by agency decisionumakers.
(C) IMPLEMENTATION STUDY-

(1) IN GENERAL-The Secretary and the Transportation Research Board

of the National Academy of Sciences shall jointly conduct a study on the
implementation of this section and the amendments made by this section.
(2) COMPONENTS-In conducting the study, the Secretary and the
Transportation Research Board shall evaluate(A) the processes developed under this section and the amendments
made by this section and the efficiencies that may result;
(B) the post-construction effectiveness of impact mitigation and
avoidance commitments adopted as part of projects conducted
under this section and the amendments made by this section; and
(C) the quantity of projects with impacts that are considered de
minimis under this section and the amendments made by this
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section, including information on the location, size, and cost of the
projects.
(3) REPORT REQUIREMENT-The
Research Board shall prepare-

Secretary and the Transportation

(A) not earlier than the date that is 4 years after the date of
enactment of this Act, a report on the results of the study conducted
under this subsection; and
(B) not later than September 30, 2009, an update on the report
required under subparagraph (A).
(4) REPORT RECIPIENTS-The Secretary and the Transportation Research
Board shall(A) submit the report and update required under paragraph (3) to(i) the appropriate committees of Congress;
(ii) the Secretary of the Interior; and
(iii) the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation; and
(B) make the report and update available to the public.

375

While this amendment does not fully adopt the broad reform-minded principles
espoused in the Bush Administration's § 4(f) proposal, it does make a number of
significant changes to § 4(f). It allows for a de minimis impacts exception for those
projects that have only a minor effect on § 4(f) protected lands. 3 7 6 Additionally, in
making this de minimis determination, the Secretary of Transportation is directed to
consider "any avoidance, minimization, mitigation, or enhancement measures" taken by
the project. 377 This provision does provide the Secretary with a measure of flexibility
when reviewing and evaluating projects. The DOT is also required to promulgate
regulations "clarify[ing] the factors to be considered and the standards to be applied in
determining the prudence and feasibility of alternatives."' 3 78 In addition, subsection (c)
of the amendment directs a joint study on the implementation of this section to be
undertaken by the DOT and the Transportation Research Board of the National
379
Academy of Sciences.

375. Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003, S. 1072, 108th Cong. §
1514 (2003). This section incorporates Senate Amendment 2285 changes and additions to the original version
of S.1072 (quotation marks omitted).
376. Id. § 1514(a).
377. Id. § 1514(a)(1)(B).
378. Id. § 1514(b).
379. Id. § 1514(c). This study is to be completed within four years after the date of enactment of the Act.
Id. § 1514(c)(3)(A). The study is required to include an evaluation of:
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The ranking member of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee,
Senator Jeffords (I-VT) spoke in support of the Voinovich § 4(f) amendment. In
summarizing the need for, and provisions of, the amendment, Senator Jeffords noted the
following:
An amendment to 4(f) is included in this legislation. The objective of this
amendment is to allow transportation projects and programs to move forward more
quickly, while maintaining the protections of 4(f). Those protections assure that there
will be public notice and opportunity for public review and comment on proposed de
minimis determinations for transportation projects, and that affected agencies will
concur in the decision of the Secretary of Transportation that there will be no adverse
380
impact on a historic site, recreation area, park, or wildlife or waterfowl refuge.
The amendment, Senator Jeffords argued, will also encourage front-end
381
consideration of mitigation measures and other environmental planning initiatives.
The provisions of the amendment, according to Senator Jeffords, are "modest, commonsense" and "assure the transportation planners will consider the location of important
habitat, wetlands and other natural resources at the earliest stages of planning for new
roads. ' 382 The effect of such early planning will be cost-savings for states and local
departments of transportation, as well as better environmental protections. 383 The
Inhofe amendment, with the Voinovich § 4(f) language, was ultimately adopted by the
Senate on February 12, 2004, and S. 1072 was also approved on the same day by a vote
384
of 76-21, with three Senators not voting.
D. H.R. 3350-The TransportationEquity Act: A Legacy for Users ("TEA-LU')

While the Senate proceeded with S. 1072 as its offering in the TEA-21
reauthorization process, the House moved forward on a parallel track with the
introduction of H.R. 3550, the Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users ("TEA-

(A) the processes developed under this section and the amendments made by this section and the
efficiencies that may result; (B) the post-construction effectiveness of impact mitigation and
avoidance commitments adopted as part of projects conducted under this section and the
amendments made by this section; [and] (C) the quantity of projects with impacts that are
considered de minimis under this section and the amendments made by this section, including
information on the location, size, and cost of the projects.
S. 1072 § 1514(c)(2)(A)-(C).
380. 150 CONG. REc. S1265 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2004).
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. Senator Jeffords noted the following:
State and Federal agencies spend considerable time and money both protecting natural areas and
building transportation infrastructure.
Unfortunately, conservation and growth efforts often
happen independently and then come into conflict during the permitting and construction phases of
a transportation project. These investments need to be coordinated. If conservation efforts are
taken into account at the earliest stages of transportation planning, both priorities can be realized,
in less time and at less cost.
Id.
384. Id. Senators Kerry (D-MA), Edwards (D-NC), and Nelson (D-NE) did not vote.
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LU"). 38 5 Unlike the Senate approach in the amended S. 1072, TEA-LU focuses only on
historic sites and remains silent on other protected lands such as parklands and wildlife
refuges. 38 6 Section 6003 of TEA-LU states the following:
SEC. 6003. POLICY ON HISTORIC SITES.

(a) TITLE 49.-Section 303 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at
the end the following:
(d) Special Rules For Historic Sites.(1) IN GENERAL- The requirements of this section are deemed to be
satisfied in any case in which the treatment of a historic site has been

agreed upon in accordance with section 106 of the National Historic
Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. § 470f) and the agreement includes a
determination that the program or project will not have an adverse effect
on the historic site.
(2) Limitation on applicability- This subsection does not apply in any
case in which the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation determines,
concurrent with or prior to the conclusion of section 106 consultation,
that allowing section 106 compliance to satisfy the requirements of this
section would be inconsistent with the objectives of the National Historic
Preservation Act. The Council shall make such a determination if
petitioned to do so by a section 106 consulting party, unless the Council

affirmatively finds that the views of the requesting party have been
adequately considered and that section 106 compliance will adequately

protect historic properties.
(3) DEFINITIONS- In this subsection, the following definitions apply:
(A)

SECTION

106

CONSULTATION-

The

term

'section

106

consultation' means the consultation process required under section
106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. § 4700.
(B) ADVERSE EFFECT- The term 'adverse effect' means altering,
directly or indirectly, any of the characteristics of a historic
property that qualify the property for inclusion in the National
Register in a manner that would diminish the integrity of the
property's location, design, setting, materials, workmanship,
feeling, or association.

385. H.R. 3550. 108th Cong. (2003). The bill was introduced on November 20, 2003.
386. Id. § 6003.

Journalof Legislation

[Vol. 31:2

(b) Title 23- Section 138 of title 23, United States Code is amended(1) by inserting '(a) POLICY- 'before 'It is'; and
(2) by striking 'In carrying' and inserting the following:
(c) STUDIES- In carrying'; and
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) (as designated by paragraph (1)) the
following:
(b) Special Rules for Historic Sites(1) IN GENERAL-The requirements of this section are deemed to be
satisfied in any case in which the treatment of a historic site has
been agreed upon in accordance with section 106 of the National
Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470f) and the agreement
includes a determination that the program or project will not have
an adverse effect on the historic site.
(2) LIMITATION ON APPLICABILITY-This subsection does not apply

in any case in which the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
determines, concurrent with or prior to the conclusion of section
106 consultation, that allowing section 106 compliance to satisfy
the requirements of this section would be inconsistent with the
objectives of the National Historic Preservation Act. The Council
shall make such a determination if petitioned to do so by a section
106 consulting party, unless the Council affirmatively finds that the
views of the requesting party have been adequately considered and
that section 106 compliance will adequately protect historic
properties.
(3) DEFINITIONS-In this subsection, the following definitions
apply:
(A)

SECTION

106

CONSULTATION-The

term

'section

106

consultation' means the consultation process required under section
106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. § 470f.
(B) ADVERSE EFFECT-The term 'adverse effect' means altering,
directly or indirectly, any of the characteristics of a historic
property that qualify the property for inclusion in the National
Register in a manner that would diminish the integrity of the
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property's location, 387
design, setting, materials, workmanship,
association.
or
feeling,
The House provision, by focusing only on historic sites, does not provide the
broader flexibility sought by the Bush Administration and the Senate. Nevertheless, it
does provide some "streamlining" to the § 4(f) program in terms of allowing
compliance with the National Historic Preservation Act to be deemed as also in
compliance with the provisions of § 4(f) as it relates to historic sites. 388 The House
approved TEA-LU, with the § 4(f) amendment concerning historic sites, on April 2,
2004, by a vote of 357-65.389
E. TEA-21 ReauthorizationConference Committee Consideration
Although the actions by the Senate and the House in 2004 regarding § 4(f)
represented significant steps on the road to reform, the path ahead remains uncertain
and not without potential obstacles. The House re-passed a TEA-21 reauthorization bill
in March, 2005 and the Senate, at the time of publication, is poised to soon do the same.
Differences between these respective bills will still have to be resolved by a HouseSenate conference committee. 39 Although a number of non-controversial items were
addressed and resolved by a conference committee in 2004, debate over the bill's overall
funding levels (an issue unrelated to § 4(f) reform) could likely continue to cause the
bill to remain stuck in the conference committee. 39 1 Resolution on the funding issues is
necessary before the conference committee is expected to tackle thornier issues such as
392
environmental streamlining and § 4(f) reform.
VI. ARRIVING WHERE WE STARTED-THE FUTURE OF § 4(f)
As TEA-21 reauthorization continues into the 109th Congress, it continues to
remain uncertain if § 4(f) reforms can be enacted in 2005. The current reauthorization
extension expires on May 31, 2005 and with legislative action pending in the Senate, it
is not yet apparent that a bill with § 4(f) reforms can become law before the current
extension expires, nor is it evident that agreement on an overall bill will be possible any
time soon due to larger (and unrelated) funding issues that continue to hamper progress
on the bill. 393 Nevertheless, the recent and current environment surrounding § 4(f) is
unparalleled in the statute's history. For the first time since its creation in 1966, a

387. 150 CONG. REC. H1845 (2004) (daily ed. Apr. 1, 2004); 150 CONG. REc. H1960 (daily ed. Apr. 1,
2004). The section was included in a substitute amendment offered during House floor consideration of the
bill.
388. See H.R. 3550, § 6003.
389. 150 CONG. REC. H2121-22 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2004).
390. Isaiah J. Poole, Another Roadblock for Transportation Conferees, Another Extension Clears, CQ
TODAY, July 23, 2004, at 3.
391. Id.
392. See e.g., Brian Stempeck, House Highway Offers Goes Nowhere Fast; No Deal Before Recess,
ENVTL. & ENERGY DAILY, July 23, 2004, at 1.

393. See Heather M. Rothman, Without Scheduled Senate Floor Time, Panels Proceed With
Transportation Bill, Transportation Watch (BNA) Apr. 8, 2005.
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concerted legislative and political effort is underway to reform § 4(f). Whether this
effort will continue to evolve remains to be seen; however, the ongoing TEA-21
reauthorization process has forced, at the very least, a re-examination of a statute that
has served as a key component of environmental and historic preservation law. And,
given the bipartisan support for changes to § 4(f), it appears that additional change is in
the future for § 4(f).
A. Possibilitiesfor Change

With this backdrop in mind, it is useful to look at some of the possibilities for
change that may exist for § 4(f). Many of these proposed changes seek a return to the
principles of flexibility and balance denoted in the conference report floor debate on the
original § 4(f). Among the many suggestions for reforming § 4(f), the following
proposals have received the most attention: (1) adopting a de minimis exception for
projects that have an insignificant impact on § 4(f) protected lands; 394 (2) expanding the
current nationwide permits approach; 395 (3) allowing the Secretary to engage in a
balancing test when determining whether or not a proposed project will use or affect a §
4(f) protected land; 396 (4) ensuring that maintenance of existing facilities does not
trigger § 4(f) protections;397 (5) allowing compliance with Section 106 of the National
to take a more
Historic Preservation Act to satisfy § 4(f); and 398 (6) permitting the states
399
active and up-front role in the enforcement and application of § 4(f).
B. Going Back to the Future

As the discussion above has revealed, these proposals for change bubbled up over
many years, often as a response to court cases and/or specific projects. When analyzing
the voluminous case law comprising § 4(f) jurisprudence, it is also useful to do so in the
context of the original legislative history that accompanied the creation of § 4(f).
Indeed, one of the best guides for determining what the future may hold is to look to the
past. To paraphrase T.S. Eliot, the result of exploration is often to arrive back from
whence one came and to know it for the first time. In this case, that means turning back
to the legislative history of § 4(f), so that we can "know" § 4(f) for the first time.
Proponents for changing § 4(f) would be well-served to cite the statements made by
Congressmen Kluczynski and Rostenkowski in 1966 during the debate of the DOT Act.
Although, these statements are obviously (and some would argue, merely) legislative
history, they are nevertheless prescient and persuasive as to the need to have flexibility

394. See supra Part V.C.
395. See, e.g., supra Part V.A.
396. See, e.g., supra Part IV.E.
397. See e.g., supra Part V.A.1. See also supraPart IV.C.
398. See e.g., supra Part V.C. It should be noted that on March 10, 2005, the Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation approved "an exemption that would relieve Federal agencies from the requirement of
taking into account the effects of their undertakings on the Interstate Highway System, except with regard to

certain individual elements or structures that are part of the system." See Exemption Regarding Historic
Preservation Review Process for Effects to the Interstate Highway System, 70 Fed. Reg. 11,928 (Mar. 10,
2005). Additional legislative reforms may still be warranted in order to fully clarify this important issue.
399. See e.g., supra Part V.B.
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and balance in the § 4(f) program. These statements also serve as the best evidence
available as to how § 4(f) was viewed by those called upon to vote to approve or not
approve it.
1. Restoring § 4(f)'s Legislative Roots
concerning the original conference
As discussed above, the legislative history,.400
Referencing the committee and
report that spawned the current § 4(f) is revealing.
other debate that took place during the development of the original § 4(f) language,
Congressman Rostenkowski observed that "[i]t was made clear at the time that as
desirable as parkland preservation might be, other important factors must be
considered. 40 1 Congressman Rostenkowski could "easily forsee circumstances when it
may be vital to use such [protected] lands."' 402 He offered specific examples:
For instance, if it became necessary to choose between preserving a wildlife refuge or
saving human lives by a highway improvement, I do not think any of us would have
any doubt as to which choice should be made. Or if there were a choice between
using public parkland or displacing hundreds of families, with the attendant burden
imposed on them, I would want the Secretary to weigh his decision carefully, and not
feel he was forced
by the provision of the bill to disrupt the lives of hundreds of
40 3
human beings.
It is interesting to note that the statements of Congressmen Kluczynski and
Rostenkowski are seldom cited or mentioned in the many cases and policy debates that
have occurred since § 4(f)'s creation. This fact is even more interesting considering
these statements represent the only substantive comments made by members of
Congress during the legislative debate on the conference report for the DOT Act of
1966. Surely, the current Congress and other policy and judicial decision-makers would
benefit from a review of these statements. Efforts to change, re-examine, or reform §
4(f) should start first with an analysis of the early history of the creation of § 4(f).
2. Mending the Judicial Split
Much has happened in the transportation and environmental law and policy arenas
since § 4(f) arrived on the scene nearly forty years ago. The case law interpreting the
scope and application of § 4(f), over this time period, has not fully clarified the reach of
§ 4(f). Rather, the true meaning of § 4(f) has been made murky by the differing
approaches that certain courts of appeals have adopted. In addition to reviewing the
legislative history of § 4(f), it also is necessary to enact a clear statement on how § 4(f)
should be interpreted, implemented and enforced. A clear statement by Congress
addressing the split among the circuits over the issue of how strictly § 4(f) should be
interpreted would be of great benefit to all participants in the process-transportation
400.
401.
402.
403.

See supra Part 11.B.2.
112 CONG. REc. H26651 (1966) (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1966) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski).
Id.
Id. at H26651-52.
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.-. 404
planners and builders, environmentalists and historic preservationists.
Providing a
resolution to this judicial split could be found in § 4(f)'s40original
legislative
history, a
5
history that suggests rigor but also balance and flexibility.
The recent legislative efforts made by Senators Voinovich and Inhofe and
Congressman Don Young and others reveal, perhaps, a possible new path for § 4(f). By
allowing for flexibility in administering the § 4(f) process, this recent legislative
approach might restore balance between the often competing, yet always intertwined,
camps of the transportation planners and engineers and the environmentalists.
Regardless of the outcome of the TEA-21 reauthorization process and whether or not it
ultimately includes § 4(f) reform language along the lines of the recent Senate or House
approaches, the issue of balancing these interests will not go away anytime soon. After
nearly forty years, the moment for change has arrived, and it is unlikely that those
Senators, Members of Congress, associations and other interested parties and advocates
for change will retire from the field without at least partial resolution as to how § 4(f)
should be interpreted and applied. The coming months will likely be the beginning of a
new, more clarified, path for § 4(f) jurisprudence.

404. See, e.g., Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 3550-Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy
for Users (Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/108-2/hr3550saph.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005) ("A clarification of the Section 4(f) definition of 'prudent' is needed to
forestall confusing standards applied unevenly by the Federal Courts of Appeals.").
405. See supra Part II.B.2.

